

Joint Publication 3-08



Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I



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PREFACE

1. Scope

This volume discusses the interagency environment and ~~describes~~ provides fundamental principles and joint doctrine to ~~best achieve facilitate~~ coordination between ~~the combatant commands of the~~ the Armed Forces of the United States, the Department of Defense, and ~~agencies of the other~~ US Government agencies, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and regional security organizations. ~~and international organizations during unified actions and joint operations. It provides potential methodologies to synchronize successful interagency operations.~~ Volume II describes ~~the~~ key US Government departments and agencies and ~~nongovernmental and international organizations~~ IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and US military involvement in multinational ~~and interagency~~ operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine ~~(or JTTP)~~ will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures

1 not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational
2 command's doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations,
3 and doctrine.
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-08, DATED 9 OCTOBER 1996

- **List Summary of Changes Here - To Be Written and Provided after Final Coordination**
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Provides an Introduction to Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination
- Discusses Established Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Relationships
- Covers Organizing for Successful Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

The Purpose of Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military elements of power supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and regional security organizations.

Interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government (USG), including the Department of Defense (DOD), for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, **intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination** refer to coordination between elements of DOD and NGOs or IGOs to achieve an objective.

The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. Military operations must be coordinated with the activities of other agencies of the USG, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, the operations of foreign forces and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. Sometimes the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organizations, sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power of the USG. **Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination** enables the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals.

Command Relationships

Within the US government (USG), the Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies.

During combat operations such as DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide military support to civil authorities, its forces perform in a supporting role. **Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency coordination.**

USG agencies — including DOD — may be placed in supported or supporting relationships with IGOs. Even when placed in a supporting role, however, US military forces always remain under the command authority of the President. In many operations, though, US agencies' relationship with IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. In such cases, cooperation is voluntary and will be based upon shared goals and good will. NGOs do not operate within military, or the governmental, or IGO's hierarchy. Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is neither supported nor supporting.

A coordinated and integrated effort between the joint force and other government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the command and control of a military operation. Military operations depend upon a command structure that is often very different from that of civilian organizations. These differences may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG agencies' different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are explicitly antithetical to those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

Building Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task.

The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:

Define the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms. Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem.

Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for each involved organization or agency. Commanders and decision makers should seek a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria.

Understand the differences between US national objectives, end state and transition criteria and those of IGOs and NGOs. Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs organizations may participate in some level in defining the problem ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own.

Establish a Common Frame of Reference. Differences in terminology and — in the case of foreign organizations — the use of English as a second language complicate coordination.

Develop Courses of Action (COAs) or Options. These should address the problem and achieve the objectives. Commanders and their staffs should focus their efforts on the military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.

Capitalize on Experience. Review the after action reports and lessons learned using the Joint and Service's Lessons Learned Systems and the US Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute to assess proposed COAs and to reduce the requirement to relearn on the job.

Establish Responsibility. A common sense of ownership and commitment toward resolution is achievable when all participants understand what needs to be done and agree upon the means to accomplish it.

Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions. In most multi-agency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the area of operations. Therefore, prior to employing military forces, it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities.

Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort. Lead agency responsibility is situationally dependent, with the National Security Council (NSC) staff setting the agenda for and normally designating the lead agency for situations in which DOD will participate. While not immutable, the principle of lead agency is

applied to a variety of functions requiring interagency coordination.

The National Security Council System

The National Security Council is the principal forum to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and the National Security Council System as the process to coordinate executive departments and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security policies.

The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in conjunction with the National Economic Council). Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc), high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, **the National Security Council System (NSCS) provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy.** The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies.

NSC Organization. The members of the NSC constitute the President's personal and principal staff for national security issues. The council tracks and directs the development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President but does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central, coordinating, or monitoring role in the development of policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the National Security Advisor. **National Security Presidential Directive-1 establishes three levels of formal interagency committees** for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. The advisory bodies include the following:

The NSC/Principals Committee is the senior Cabinet level interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.

The NSC/Deputies Committee is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary level) interagency forum for consideration of policy issues affecting national security.

The NSC Policy Coordination Committees are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.

Federal Interagency Coordination: Civil Support

The US military provides assistance to civil authorities on a routine basis.

While the most visible support occurs during domestic emergencies or major disasters, the majority of DOD's support is in support of civilian law enforcement or intelligence agencies. **This assistance is known as civil support within the defense community because the assistance will always be in support of a lead federal agency.** Requests for assistance from another agency may be predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from a Presidential designation of a Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency. The military typically only responds after the resources of other federal agencies, state and local governments, and NGOs have been exhausted or when unique military assets are required.

The Department of Defense works closely with other Federal agencies in various domestic arenas. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, **DOD is a partner in several national level incident management and emergency response plans** such as the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan, the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism Concept of Operations Plan, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, and the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan.

Military forces may also conduct missions to help the Department of Justice or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) includes military assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of operations that typically require MSCLEA are, counterdrug, combatting terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical asset assurance.

Interagency Coordination: Foreign Operations

Within the Executive Branch, the Department of State is the lead US foreign affairs agency.

The Department of State (DOS) advises and assists the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. External politico-military relationships of DOD include: bilateral and multilateral military relationships; treaties and agreements involving other DOD activities or interests, such as: technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, FHA, peace operations (including those conducted under United Nations auspices), and other contingencies.

The combatant commander's regional focus is paralleled at the DOS in its geographic bureaus. Similarly, many other USG agencies are regionally organized. Within a theater, **the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination.**

The joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS.

The Nongovernmental Organizations' Connection to Joint Operations

Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. **Because of their capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation.**

NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena.

Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster.

Whereas the military's initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably.

The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations

Intergovernmental organizations may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency coordination.

Organizing for Success

To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset.

When campaign, deliberate, or crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort. The combatant commander through his strategic concept builds the interagency activities into Annex V of the operation plan. Subordinate JFCs build interagency participation into their operations. Within the area of responsibility and the joint operations area, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, joint task force (JTF) headquarters (HQ), and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues.

Forming a Joint Task Force

When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to establish a joint task force (JTF), the JTF establishing authority will normally be a combatant commander.

The combatant commander develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon direction from the Secretary of Defense as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If developed, the NSC's interagency political/military plan may affect the mission statement. The combatant commander appoints a commander, joint task force (CJTF) and in conjunction with the CJTF determines the necessary military capabilities required to accomplish military objectives. A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ as necessary to accomplish the objectives.

The JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations task force to meet a specific contingency mission or to support humanitarian, nation assistance operations, or a theater campaign

of limited duration. There may be a requirement for civil affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the functional issues involved, as well as their expertise in dealing with other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.

JTFs in the interagency process.

Unlike the military, most USG agencies and NGOs are not equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, with the result that JTF personnel interface with individuals who are coordinating their organization's activities at more than one level. The unique aspects of the interagency process require the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, NGOs, the HN, and IGOs. Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, **the focal point for operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the civil-military operations center, or the humanitarian operations center.**

CONCLUSION

This volume discusses the interagency environment and provides fundamental principles and joint doctrine to facilitate coordination between the Armed Forces of the United States, the Department of Defense, and other US Government agencies, IGOs, NGOs, and regional security organizations. Volume II describes key US Government departments and agencies and IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION TO INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION

“When the United States undertakes military operations, the Armed Forces of the United States are only one component of a national-level effort involving all instruments of national power. Instilling unity of effort at the national level is necessarily a cooperative endeavor involving a number of Federal departments and agencies. In certain operations, agencies of states, localities, or foreign countries may also be involved. The President establishes guidelines for civil-military integration and normally disseminates decisions and monitors execution through the NSC [National Security Council].”

Joint Publication 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States*

1. The Purpose of Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination and Operations

a. Interagency coordination is ~~a process that brings together agencies, departments, and organizations. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines “interagency coordination” as follows: “Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of the Department of Defense and engaged agencies of the US Government (USG) agencies, including the Department of Defense (DOD), nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective.” Similarly, in the context of DOD involvement, intergovernmental organization (IGO) and nongovernmental organization (NGO) coordination refer to coordination between elements of DOD and NGOs or IGOs to achieve an objective.~~

b. The integration of US political and military objectives and the subsequent translation of these objectives into demonstrable action have always been essential to success at all levels of operation. The changing global environment that is characterized by regional instability, ~~the growth of pluralistic governments, failed states, increasing weapons proliferation,~~ global terrorism, and unconventional threats to US citizens, interests, and territories, requires even greater cooperation ~~during interagency operations. Attaining our national objectives requires the efficient and effective use of the diplomatic, informational, economic, and military elements of power supported by and coordinated with that of our allies and various nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and regional security organizations.~~

c. Military operations must be coordinated with ~~those the activities~~ of other agencies of the ~~United States Government (USG), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs,) regional organizations, international organizations (IOs) IGOs, as well as with the operations of~~ foreign forces, ~~and activities of various host nation (HN) agencies. A joint force commander (JFC) must be able to call upon the capabilities of all the aforementioned agencies and organizations. Sometimes the joint force commander (JFC) draws on the capabilities of other organizations, sometimes the JFC provides capabilities to other organizations, and sometimes the JFC merely deconflicts his activities with those of others.~~ These same organizations may be involved in

prehostilities operations, activities at the front lines during combat, and in the transition to posthostilities activities. Roles and relationships among agencies and organizations, combatant commands, US state and local governments, and overseas with the US chiefs of mission (COMs), and country teams in a US embassy, must be clearly understood. Interagency coordination forges the vital link between the military and the diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power of the USG. Successful interagency, IGO, and NGO coordination enables the USG to build international support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that efficiently achieve shared international goals. ~~mount coherent, efficient, and collective operations.~~

2. Synchronizing Coordinating Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Operations Efforts

a. A common thread throughout all major operations, ~~whether in war or military operations other than war (MOOTW), across the range of military operations,~~ is the involvement of a broad range—large number of agencies and organizations — many with indispensable practical competencies and major legal responsibilities — that interact with the Armed Forces of the United States and our multinational counterparts.

b. **The Military Component.** Military forces have long coordinated with the headquarters (HQ) or operating elements of USG departments and agencies to include the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and Department of ~~Transportation~~ Homeland Security, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the adjutants general of the 50 states and four territories. Increasingly, participants include state and local agencies, additional USG agencies, coalition partners, NGOs such as Doctors Without Borders and Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE), ~~regional security organizations—IGOs~~ such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), ~~IOs such as~~ the United Nations (UN), and the agencies of the ~~host nation~~ (HN).

(1) ~~The complex nature of interagency operations requires that commanders and their staffs recognize which agencies are best qualified or have the necessary resources to contribute to accomplishing a mission.~~ **Because the solution to a problem seldom, if ever, resides within the capability of just one agency, campaign or operation plans must be crafted to leverage—recognize the core competencies of the myriad agencies, coordinating ~~their military~~ efforts and resources with military capabilities toward those of other agencies to achieve the identified end state.**

(2) In a national emergency, civil support operation, or complex contingency operation (CCO), ~~Department of Defense (DOD)~~ and the military often serve in a supporting role to other agencies and organizations. Commanders and their staffs should develop an understanding of how military operations and capabilities can be coordinated with those of other agencies and organizations to focus and optimize their unique contributions on accomplishing the desired end state.

c. **A Forum of Expertise.** Each USG, federal, state or local agency, NGO, and ~~IO-IGO~~ brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the ~~interagency table task~~

1 of coordination. The military also brings its own organizational dynamics, characteristics,
2 ideas, and values ~~to interagency operations.~~ This diversity is ~~the a~~ strength of the interagency
3 process. In one ~~coordinated collective~~ forum, the process integrates many views, capabilities,
4 and options.

5
6 d. **Gathering the Right Resources.** ~~The challenge, to the nation's leadership,~~
7 ~~commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of agencies and organizations, during a~~
8 ~~period in history when challenges to the US and its interests are becoming more frequent and~~
9 ~~complex, is to recognize what resources are available to address a problem and how to~~
10 ~~work together to effectively apply them.~~ During this period of great instability and uncertainty
11 the challenge to our nation's leadership, commanders at all levels, and the civilian leadership of
12 agencies and organizations is to recognize what resources are available and how to work
13 together to effectively apply them. Despite potential philosophical and operational differences,
14 all efforts must be coordinated to create an atmosphere of cooperation that ultimately
15 contributes to national unity of effort. Therefore, pursuit of interagency coordination and
16 cooperation as a process should be viewed as a means; ~~not an end~~ to mission accomplishment,
17 not an end in itself. While some loss of organizational freedom of action is often necessary to
18 attain full cooperation, a zeal for consensus should not compromise the authority, roles, or core
19 competencies of individual agencies.

20
21 e. ~~The Within the USG, the US~~ National Security Strategy (NSS) guides the development,
22 integration, and coordination of all the instruments of national power to accomplish national
23 objectives. The President signs the NSS and the National Security Council (NSC) is the
24 principal policy-making forum responsible for the strategic-level implementation of the NSS.
25 This coordination sets the stage for strategic guidance provided to the combatant commands,
26 Services, and various DOD agencies, and forms the foundation for operational and tactical level
27 guidance.

28
29 f. The National Strategy for Homeland Security seeks a coordinated and focused effort
30 from our entire society — the federal government, state and local governments, the private
31 sector, and the American public to mobilize and organize our nation to secure the US homeland.
32 Achieving this coordinated and focused effort entails both DOD lead homeland defense and non-
33 DOD lead civil support missions. Within the civil support arena ~~Additionally~~ federal law, the
34 Federal Response Plan (FRP) (as modified by the Initial National Response Plan), and its
35 Terrorism Incident annex, other federal plans, legislation, and directives give DOD key roles in
36 providing support to civil authorities for disasters, catastrophes, infrastructure protection, and
37 other emergencies. These efforts will expand the military's requirement to integrate and
38 coordinate its efforts with state and local agencies as well as USG agencies like the Federal
39 Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), CIA, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

40
41 For additional information see the National Strategy for Homeland Security and Joint
42 Publication (JP) 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security.

43
44 g. The National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction states that nuclear,
45 biological, and chemical weapons in the possession of hostile states and terrorists represents one

of the greatest security challenges facing the United States and that we must pursue a comprehensive interagency strategy to counter this threat in all of its dimensions.

gh. Focus of Theater Operations. Joint force operations typically involve close coordination with forces and agencies outside the military chain of command. According to guidance in JP 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, JFCs should: “. . . **ensure that their joint operations are integrated and synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces** (multinational operations) and **nonmilitary organizations** ([US] government agencies such as the Agency for International Development, NGOs, and the UN). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders, especially during military operations other than war.” The extent of NGO and IGO cooperation and coordination with the military will vary and will be contingent on the nature of the mission and US military’s role in that operation (belligerent, peacekeeper, provider of aid.)

~~3.—The Evolving Role of the Armed Forces of the United States Within the Interagency Process~~

~~a. Involvement of the USG, state, and local agencies and US military forces in national emergencies and civil support operations at homewill continue in the future. There are numerous reasons why the US military is more involved in these operations than ever before in history and why US agencies are responding more frequently.~~

~~b. Since the fall of the Berlin wall, the UN Security Council has progressively increased the number of authorized multinational operations that rely on interagency coordination to effectively plan and conduct peace operations, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), and disaster relief. Consequently, there has been an increase in the number of situations to which US agencies have responded. By necessity, many of these agencies have also been drawn into closer relationships with joint military forces in every combatant commander’s area of responsibility (AOR) because their missions may fail without military support or protection. In addition to the increasing participation of US agencies, more IOs are active in the business of peacekeeping and peace enforcement.~~

~~c. Operations have become more complex. During the Cold War, the mission of military forces conducting peace operations, was to maintain a truce, as demonstrated in the Sinai and in Cyprus. Military forces of that era were not tasked to assist in the evolving concept of “nation building.” Numerous, chaotic regional crises followed the end of the Cold War as a result of the rapid increase in the number of weakened and failed states. This dramatically more complex environment pressured the international community, often under the leadership of the UN, to regularly intervene to both make and keep the peace between warring factions and to alleviate suffering. Accordingly, there is greater need for US military forces and USG agencies for developmental, civil assistance, and humanitarian relief to alleviate human suffering.~~

~~d. Two Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) established the framework for how the USG would respond to CCO. PDD 25 required a determination and set the criteria that must be met before an intervention was conducted. When the determination led to an intervention, PDD~~

56 assigned agency responsibilities in eight sectors and required the development and rehearsal of a Political-Military Implementation Plan before intervention. Subsequently, National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 1, Subject: Organization of the National Security Council System (dated 13 February 2001) superseded all previous presidential guidance, PDD-56 in particular, and has had a lasting influence on the development and execution of CCO planning and execution. It mandated changes of behavior that continue to increase and improve interagency coordination and unity of effort centering on the institutionalization of the NSC practices to manage a crisis and coordinate political-military (POLMIL) plans.

e. The US has a greater depth and array of both people and equipment resources than other countries.

3. The Growing Requirement for Close United States Government, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

The number of ongoing and potential operations requiring integrated US interagency, NGO, and IGO activities has expanded dramatically over the past few years. Moreover, given the nature of the challenges facing the US and the international community, this trend is likely to continue. Several factors contribute to this increasing need for integrated operations.

a. Although the number of ongoing conflicts worldwide has declined somewhat since the end of the Cold War, the opportunity to intervene in these crises has greatly expanded. During the Cold War, ideological divisions prevented the UN and other actors from stepping in to prevent or end conflicts that were often proxies for superpower competition. With the end of this bipolar world system, however, the UN and other organizations have instituted record numbers of peace operations (POs) and CCOs. In order to resolve these crises, such operations inevitably require close cooperation between various organizations that contribute military, humanitarian, political, economic and other forms of expertise and resources.

bc. Not only have opportunities for intervention expanded, but the USG, specifically, has increasingly chosen to participate in these operations. In part, this is due to the effects of “globalization,” i.e., the rapid expansion of international trade, communications, travel and other technologies that mean the US economy, security and political interests are increasingly implicated by events virtually anywhere in the world. Because these events are almost inevitably multi-faceted, USG interventions must effectively integrate the activities of multiple agencies in order to address them.

e. The increasing threat posed by global terrorism has also necessitated a more proactive approach to foreign operations, as well as greater interagency coordination. The National Security Strategy of September 2002 notes that the US is now threatened less by conquering states than by failing ones that willingly or unwittingly provide a haven for terrorists. The terrorist threat is further compounded by state sponsors of terrorism and by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the missile technology to deliver them over long distances. Meeting these challenges requires the integration of all elements of US national power – economic efforts to cut off terrorist financing, diplomatic initiatives to eliminate terrorists’

political support, informational activities to combat extremist ideologies, and military operations to take direct action against identified threats.

d. The need for US interagency coordination is also being recognized and institutionalized at the national level. USG agencies — just like the separate Military Services — achieve national objectives more effectively and efficiently when their operations are synchronized as part of a coherent, unified effort. In the 1990s, this insight led to the promulgation of two Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that established procedures for interagency coordination and decision making specifically for peacekeeping and complex crisis operations. PDD-25 established criteria for US support to peacekeeping operations and delineated the responsibilities of DOD and DOS. PDD-56 created an interagency planning process for use in developing and implementing integrated USG responses to complex contingencies. Although both of these documents became invalid upon the change of presidential administrations in 2001, they have had a significant impact on the way the USG approaches interagency coordination. In addition, a successor National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) to PDD-56 is currently in draft.

4. Command Relationships

a. **Within the USG, The Armed Forces and other USG agencies perform in both supported and supporting roles with other commands and agencies. However, this is not the support command relationship. Relationships between the joint force and other government agencies, IGOs, and NGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation.** During combat operations such as DESERT STORM or in foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations such as PROVIDE COMFORT, DOD was the lead agency and was supported by other agencies. When DOD is tasked to provide military support to civil authorities, its forces perform in a supporting role. **Whether supported or supporting, close coordination between the military and other non-DOD agencies is a key to successful interagency operations coordination.**

~~b. When the Secretary of Defense designates supported and supporting command relationships between combatant commanders for the planning and execution of joint operations, supporting DOD agencies are designated as appropriate. The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take action to fulfill them within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks. For example, in a typical situation, the commander of a geographic combatant command is supported by functional combatant commands, such as the US Transportation Command (USSTRANSCOM) for air mobility assets and the US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) for space based assets. Additionally, other geographic combatant commanders provide forces and resources to accomplish the designated supported commander's mission. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the supported commander will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. The supporting commander determines the forces, tactics, methods, procedures, and communications to be employed in providing this support. The supporting commander will advise and coordinate with the supported commander on matters concerning the employment and limitations (e.g., logistics) of~~



With the breakdown of nation-states, there is greater need for developmental, civil assistance, and humanitarian relief organizations to alleviate human suffering.

1 such support, assist in planning for the integration of such support into the supported
2 commander's effort as a whole, and ensure that support requirements are appropriately
3 communicated within the supporting commander's organization.

4 b. USG agencies — including DOD — may be placed in supported or supporting
5 relationships with IGOs. Even when placed in a supporting role, however, US military forces
6 always remain under the command authority of the President. In many operations, though, US
7 agencies' relationship with IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. In such cases, cooperation
8 is voluntary and will be based upon shared goals and good will.

9
10 eb. NGOs do not operate within military, or the governmental, UN, or IGO's hierarchy.
11 Therefore, the relationship between the Armed Forces and NGOs is neither supported nor
12 supporting. An associate or partnership relationship may develop during some missions.
13 For example, if the UN has provided a grant to an NGO to implement a project, the NGO would
14 be considered its "implementing partner." If formed, the civil-military operations center
15 (CMOC) is the focal point where US military forces provide coordinated coordinate any support
16 to NGOs. As private organizations, NGOs are very unlikely to place themselves in a supporting
17 role to the military. They may, however, accept grant funding from IGOs or USG agencies like
18 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), thereby taking the role of
19 "implementing partners." While this relationship is not so strong as command authority or even
20 a contract, it does give the granting agency oversight authority over how the funds are spent.

21
22 *For additional information on the CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military*
23 *Operations, and JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.*

5. Considerations for Effective Cooperation

a. ~~A coordinated and integrated effort in an interagency operation between the joint force and other government agencies, NGOs, and IGOs should not be equated to the command and control (C2) of a military operation.~~ Military operations depend upon a command structure that ~~may be unfamiliar to or radically is often very~~ different ~~than from that of~~ civilian organizations. These differences ~~between military and civilian command structures~~ may present significant challenges to coordination efforts. The various USG agencies' different, and sometimes conflicting, goals, policies, procedures, and decision-making techniques make unity of effort a challenge. Still more difficult, some NGOs and IGOs may have policies that are purposely explicitly antithetical to both the military and government agencies those of the USG, and particularly the US military.

b. ~~Interagency processes designed to achieve unity of effort, are often more the result of art than science.~~ The military, on the other hand, tends to rely on structured decision-making processes, detailed planning, the use of standardized techniques and procedures, and sophisticated ~~military~~ C2 systems to coordinate and synchronize operations. Civilian agencies similarly employ standardized, methodical decision-making principles but may not have the same degree of internal C2 as does the US military. Across agency lines, IGO and NGOs tend to coordinate because there is a perceived mutually supportive interest, not because of any formalized C2. Unity of effort can only be achieved through eClose, continuous interagency and interdepartmental coordination and cooperation. ~~All~~ are necessary to overcome confusion over objectives, inadequate structure or procedures, and bureaucratic and personal limitations. Action will follow understanding.

c. ~~With increased involvement in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, USG agencies have been significantly shaped by the two PDDs: As USG involvement in POs and CCOs increased during the 1990s, the Executive Branch responded by promulgating two PDDs that have significantly shaped subsequent interagency coordination:~~

(1) PDD-25, "US Policy – Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," was signed in May 1994 as the result of initiated an interagency review of our nation's peacekeeping policies and programs. This review aimed to develop a comprehensive peace operations policy framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War period. ~~This policy review has resulted in PDD-25, signed in May 1994.~~ PDD-25 addressed six major issues of reform and improvement. One in particular, defined interagency policy, lines of authority, roles, and missions for DOD and DOS when coordinating peace operations. Described in PDD-25 as "improving the way the USG manages and funds peace operations," supporting directives follow:

(a) The policy directive created a new "shared responsibility" approach to managing and funding UN peace operations within the USG. Under this approach, DOD took lead management and funding responsibility for those UN operations that involve US combat units and those that are likely to involve combat (e.g., UN Chapter VII). This approach ensured that military expertise is brought to bear on those operations that have a significant military component. The DOS retained lead management and funding responsibility for traditional peacekeeping operations that do not involve US combat units. In all cases, the DOS remains

1 responsible for the conduct of diplomacy and instructions to embassies and our UN mission in
2 New York.

3
4 (b) PDD-25 therefore, elevated DOD to the status of lead Federal Agency (LFA)
5 for ~~certain POs, US-supported, UN Chapter VII, peace enforcement missions,~~ thereby requiring
6 it to lead the planning and management of operations that have a strong nonmilitary component,
7 in coordination with operations with other nonmilitary organizations. ~~plan and manage~~
8 ~~nonmilitary operations with nonmilitary organizations.~~

9
10 ~~(2) PDD-56, “US Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations,”~~
11 ~~significantly influenced present day CCO planning and execution. Despite many political and~~
12 ~~organizational constraints, it mandated changes of behavior that increased and improved~~
13 ~~interagency coordination and unity of effort. As an example, NATO operation ALLIED~~
14 ~~FORCE provided the first venue to invoke PDD 56 resulting in significant improvements in~~
15 ~~strategic-level planning. PDD 56, May 1997, explained key elements of policy on managing~~
16 ~~CCO and interagency planning for CCO. Also, it is intended for use in USG professional~~
17 ~~education institutions, such as National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs~~
18 ~~Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. The~~
19 ~~PDD’s intent was to establish these management practices to achieve unity of effort among USG~~
20 ~~agencies and IOs engaged in CCO. The PDD proposed mechanisms and planning processes to:~~

21
22 ~~(a) Identify appropriate missions and tasks, if any, for USG agencies in a USG~~
23 ~~response.~~

24
25 ~~(b) Develop strategies for early resolution of crises, thereby minimizing the loss of~~
26 ~~life and establishing the basis for reconciliation and reconstruction.~~

27
28 ~~(c) Accelerate planning and implementation of the civilian aspects of the~~
29 ~~operation; intensify action on critical funding and personnel requirements early on; integrate all~~
30 ~~components of a US response (civilian, military, police, etc.) at the policy level and facilitate the~~
31 ~~creation of coordination mechanisms at the operational level; and rapidly identify issues for~~
32 ~~senior policy makers and ensure expeditious implementation of decisions.~~

33
34 (2) PDD-56, Managing Complex Contingency Operations.

35
36 (a) PDD-56 was promulgated in May 1997 to address shortcomings in
37 interagency decision making, doctrine, planning and cooperation that had been identified during
38 previous CCOs. It established mechanisms through which the USG could: determine what, if
39 any, response the USG would take to a given crisis; identify the desired end-state for a CCO;
40 establish an appropriate division of labor between involved USG agencies; and develop an
41 integrated plan for applying all elements of national power to resolve the crisis situation. A key
42 component of this planning effort is the political-military implementation plan (POLMIL plan),
43 which sets the context for the overall USG effort. A POLMIL plan includes: a situation
44 assessment; delineation of US interests and strategic purpose; a mission statement for the

operation; concept of the operation; the tasks and responsibilities of involved USG agencies; individual agency sub-plans; the desired end-state; and an exit strategy.

(b) In addition to these planning and decision-making mechanisms, PDD-56 required the USG to conduct after action reviews (AARs) of interagency performance during CCOs. It also mandated that US agency personnel be trained in CCO management, utilizing coursework and exercises conducted at institutions like the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center.

(c) Although PDD-56 is no longer in force, the current administration has drafted, but not yet approved, an NSPD replacement for PDD-56. This draft NSPD reiterates the planning, decision making, AAR and training mechanisms and requirements established in PDD-56. In addition, it goes on to address proactive mechanisms for anticipating and preventing complex foreign crises before they occur.

6. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures

a. A principal difficulty of coordinating operations among US agencies is determining counterparts among them. Organizational differences exist between the military hierarchy and other USG departments and agencies, particularly at the operational level where counterparts to the geographic combatant commander seldom exist. Further, overall lead authority in a CCO is likely to be exercised not by the geographic combatant commander, but by a US ambassador or other senior civilian, who will provide policy and goals for all USG agencies and military organizations in the operation.

b. Decision making at the lowest levels is frequently thwarted because field coordinators may not be vested with the authority to speak for parent agencies, departments, or organizations. Figure I-1 depicts comparative organizational structures using the three “levels of war.”

7. The Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Environments

a. In order for the interagency process to be successful, it should bring together the interests of multiple agencies, departments, and organizations. This cohesion is even more complex than the multidimensional nature of military combat operations. When the other instruments of national power — diplomatic, informational, and economic — are applied, the complexity of the effort and the number and types of interactions expand significantly. The essence of interagency coordination is the effective integration of ~~of~~ multiple agencies with ~~individual~~ their diverse perspectives and agendas. ~~This process and the divergent agency cultures typically challenge the results-oriented military ethos.~~

b. **The Nature of Interagency Bureaucracy.** ~~One of the basic precepts of the American political system is to distribute power to prevent any one branch from accumulating overwhelming influence over any political process. Only during national emergencies and war, are certain powers concentrated in the executive branch. Otherwise, i~~Interagency coordination processes tend to be bureaucratic and diffused, inhibiting the concentration of power within a small or select group of agencies. The executive branch of the federal government is organized by function with each department performing certain core tasks. In achieving national security goals and executing national security policy, the NSC plays a critical role in orchestrating interagency cooperation to achieve unity of effort.

(1) **Core Values.** Each agency has core values that it will not compromise. These values form the foundation upon which key functions of the agency grow. In any interaction, all

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES AGENCY ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURES			
	ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES	EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS & AGENCIES	STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT
STRATEGIC	Secretary of Defense Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Combatant Commander (1)	National Headquarters Department Secretaries	Governor
OPERATIONAL	Combatant Commander Commander, Joint Task Force (CJTF) (2) Defense Coordinating Officer/Defense Coordinating Element	Ambassador/Embassy (3) Liaisons (4) Federal Coordinating Officer Regional Office	State Adjutant General State Coordinating Officer Office of Emergency Services Department/Agency
TACTICAL	CJTF Components Service Functional	Ambassador/Embassy Field Office US Agency for International Development (USAID)/ Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)/ Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)/ Liaison (5) Response Team US Refugee Coordinator	National Guard County Commissioner Mayor/Manager County City (e.g., Police Department)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> The combatant commander, within the context of unified action, may function at both the strategic and operational levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, United States Government (USG) agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), regional organizations, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and corporations toward theater strategic objectives. The CJTF, within the context of unified action, functions at both the operational and tactical levels in coordinating the application of all instruments of national power with the actions of other military forces, USG agencies, NGOs, regional organizations, IGOs, and corporations toward theater operational objectives. The Ambassador and Embassy (which includes the country team) function at both the operational and tactical levels and may support joint operation planning conducted by a combatant commander or CJTF. Liaisons at the operational level may include the Foreign Policy Advisor or Political Advisor assigned to the combatant commander by the Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency liaison officer, or any other US agency representative assigned to the Joint Interagency Coordinating Group or otherwise assigned to the combatant commander's staff. USAID's OFDA provides its rapidly deployable DART in response to international disasters. A DART provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of USG response to disasters. 			

Figure I-1. Comparison of United States Agency Organizational Structures

participants must be constantly aware that each agency will continuously cultivate and create external sources of support and maneuver to protect its core values.

(2) **Insular Vision.** Individual agency perspective and agendas complicate policy development. **Domestic politics is usually the single most important driver of the various USG agencies' agendas,** which may or may not coincide with international security issues.

(3) **Reduction of Uncertainty.** Many bureaucracies try to standardize their operations but often fail to prepare for crisis management. Uncertainty increases in a crisis and it is likely that compromises will be made. Compromise may bring the sacrifice of power, security, or prestige. Uncertainty allows for the coexistence of varying views about the likely outcomes of a given action; these differences in viewpoint often lead to conflicting interests. An organization will seek to reduce uncertainty and lessen the threat to its own stability. Information can reduce uncertainty and increase an organization's power. **Thus, information equates to power in interagency operationscoordination, as it provides those who possess it a decided advantage in the decision-making process.**

~~(4) **Individual Agendas.** Private agendas can significantly affect interagency consensus. The goals of an institution may conflict with the private, usually short term, agendas of its members. Because individual personalities play such large parts in interagency operations, personal agendas can be significant — often even creating an informal hierarchy of the department or agency. All organizations have some sort of formal and informal hierarchy, which results in a specific distribution of power, income, and prestige among the members of the organization. Informal structures are created to serve the personal needs of the organization's members and tend to modify the organization's overall behavior pattern. Informal structures inherent in every organization contribute significantly to its ability to perform formal functions. Thus, developing an understanding of an organization and of the personalities involved in its informal structure can provide insight to how the organization performs.~~

c. **Consensus Within the Department of Defense.** Before attempting to gain consensus in the interagency arena, it must first be attained within DOD. The various elements — Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, Defense agencies and DOD field activities, Military Departments, and combatant commands — should ~~agree to the ends, ways, and means of an operation before trying to integrate the military instrument of power with~~ develop a common position on the appropriate military role in interagency coordination before broadening the discussion to include other agencies, departments, and organizations. DOD has a common culture, procedures, and a hierarchical structure.

THE VALUE OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS

General Jacob Devers, US Army commander of the 6th Army Group in World War II, wrote that in coalition operations the personalities and the ambitions of the senior commanders of each of the armed services of the Allied Powers under his command were critical toward making the coalition work.

General Schwarzkopf and Saudi Arabia's Lieutenant General Khaled were able to forge the bonds of mutual respect and create an atmosphere that permeated both of their staffs and impacted on every action and every decision.

The Combined Civil Affairs Task Force, which assisted in the reconstruction of Kuwait after the Gulf War, was able to obtain interagency cooperation and establish subordinate interagency support based largely on personal relationships. Colonel Randall Elliot, USAR, who put the organization together, was also the senior analyst in the Near East Division of the DOS's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He knew the US Ambassador-designate to Kuwait, Edward "Skip" Gnehm, and was able to recruit Major **Andres Andrew** Natsios, USAR, whose civilian job was Director of USAID's Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance. Major Natsios brought Mr. Fred Cuny from INTERTEC, a contractor specializing in disaster relief, into the task force. Thus, USAID and its contractors were integrated into the operation based on these personal relationships.

Successful interagency cooperation rests in no small part on the ability of the Ambassador, the geographic combatant commander, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretaries of the USG departments and agencies to personally work together.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

d. Understanding Other Agencies, Departments, and Organizations.

~~(1) Other Federal agencies can see the ends, ways, and means differently than does DOD. Even though the ends may be agreed to by all (as they are in the counterdrug war), the ways and the means may differ from agency to agency. Distinct organizational cultures can inhibit cooperation among agencies. Commonly an agency employs resources in ways that run counter to other agencies' cultures. What one agency views as "by the book" or "slow and bureaucratic," may be perceived by other agencies as "fast and loose" or "flexible and responsive." Interagency participants should understand that agencies are often guided by their own cultures (to include the Armed Forces of the US) and that an appreciation of these cultural differences and of other agencies' priorities, procedures, capabilities, and terminology will pay dividends during interagency coordination and execution. Understanding the significance that each organizational culture plays in successful interagency coordination can help effect workable compromise and thus integrate all of the instruments of national power.~~

~~(2) NGOs and IOs present yet another kind of challenge. NGOs' structure is decentralized and C2 is horizontal rather than vertical in authority. Generally, there is latitude for individual initiative as a great deal of autonomy exists within most NGOs. This is particularly true when the coordination may constrain normal operating procedures or reduce flexibility. Because they are not part of a governmental structure, they may have difficulty accepting and adapting to its procedures, even though they may share the same immediate goals. Due to different internal organization, IOs may have a difficulty relating to the structure of~~

~~military organizations and their standard operating procedures. These organizations may embrace a set of principles that is at odds with the goal of military operations. However, their expertise may be essential to the successful accomplishment of the mission. Operations PROVIDE COMFORT and ALLIED HARBOR provide two examples of successful cooperation between the Armed Forces of the US and the humanitarian relief community. Operation PROVIDE COMFORT provided relief to the Kurdish refugees from northern Iraq and protection for humanitarian relief efforts. It began on April 6, 1991 and ended July 24, 1991. On April 13, 1999, NATO approved plans for Operation ALLIED HARBOR, a 10,000-troop NATO deployment to support humanitarian relief efforts for refugees resulting from the Serb expulsion of ethnic Albanians from Kosovo. The United States contribution to ALLIED HARBOR was Joint Task Force (JTF) Shining Hope. The mission of JTF Shining Hope was to conduct FHA operations in support of USG agencies and NGOs and IOs engaged in providing humanitarian relief to Kosovar refugees in Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.~~

~~(3) Each agency, department, and organization has different access and a different perspective. This difference can result in a dysfunctional approach to security issues. Determining the desired end states in Kuwait, the Kurdish areas, and the Balkans illustrated the inherent challenge to achieving unity of effort when different organizations have differing visions. (Appendix J, Vol II of this publication, "Humanitarian Assistance in Complex Emergencies/The Mohonk Criteria," contains criteria developed by the World Conference on Religion and Peace for addressing disasters. It may provide commanders with a better understanding of the philosophy of the international relief community and thus furnish insight into conducting military operations in concert with these organizations.)~~

ed. Establishing Unifying Goals. Reaching consensus on **a unifying goal_s** is an important prerequisite for successful interagency operations. Consensus must be constantly nurtured, which is much more difficult if the goals are not clear or change over time. At the national level, this consensus is usually attained by the NSC staff and ~~often usually~~ results in an NSC committee meeting Statement of Conclusions, an NSPD, or a POLMIL plan explaining establishing the goals of an operation and establishing interagency responsibilities. The objective is to ensure all USG agencies clearly understand NSC policy objectives and subsequent responsibilities. **Some compromise that limits the freedom of individual agencies may be required to gain consensus.** The greater the number of agencies and the more diversified the goals, the more difficult it is to reach consensus. A crisis — such as ~~Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the plight of the Kurds, the flooding of Bangladesh, or~~ the acts of terrorism of 11 September, 2001 against the Pentagon and the World Trade Center — increases the likelihood that compromises will be made and a consensus can be reached. Because a common unifying goal is so important, **a great deal of time is spent on clarifying and restating the goals.** Because a common threat brings a coalition together, the differences often revolve around ways and means. Many techniques that have been developed in coalition operations that can be used to facilitate interagency operations cooperation.

fe. Mutual Needs and Interdependence. After developing an understanding of other agencies, **determine the mutual needs of all participating agencies.** All organizations will strive to maintain their interests, policies, and core values. These must be considered to **ensure**

~~total-facilitate~~ interagency cooperation. **Functional interdependence means that one organization relies upon another to attain the objective. This interdependence is a strong and potentially lasting bond between agencies, departments, and organizations.** NGOs and IGOs most effectively conducted relief operations in Somalia and the early evolutions in the Balkans in the 1990s with the security provided by the Armed Forces of the United States. The Armed Forces of the United States cannot conduct a long-range deployment without the DOS securing overflight and en-route basing agreements. Resource interdependence is based on one organization providing certain capabilities that another organization lacks. This support includes such resources as manpower, logistics, training augmentation, communication, and money and establishes a framework for cooperation. These interdependencies can develop over time and lead the way to true interagency cooperation. **Ensuring that all organizations share the responsibility for the job and receive appropriate recognition strengthens these bonds of interdependence.** The purpose of such recognition is to wed all of the engaged agencies to the process by validating and reinforcing their positive ~~interagency~~-participation. ~~(The following a~~Appendixes in Vol II of this publication describe the authority, responsibilities, organization, capabilities and core competencies, and pertinent contact information for many of these agencies, departments, and organizations: ~~Appendix A, “US Government Agencies,” Appendix B, “Nongovernmental Organizations,” Appendix C, “Regional and International Organizations,” Appendix D, “Agency Capabilities and Resources — Quick Look,” and Appendix H, “Interagency Telephone and Facsimile Number Listing.”)~~

~~g.f.~~ **Consider Long-Term and Short-Term Objectives.** Long- and short-term objectives should be considered separately. ~~Participants should not lose sight of establishing a continuing relationship in deference to the issue at hand.~~ At the strategic level of war, the combatant commander may work with policy coordinating committees through the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) (in coordination with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ICJCS) who participates at NSC and ministerial-level discussions, setting long-term policy goals. The combatant commander will also confront short-term operational objectives and coordinate with ambassadors, their country teams, multinational and interagency staffs, and task forces. ~~Long- and short-term objectives should have connectivity and the combatant commander must organize the command to deal with each successfully.~~

BUILDING AN UNDERSTANDING IS NECESSARY

“Not only do UN, international organizations, and nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations not understand the military organization, we likewise do not understand them. They often have exaggerated impressions as to our capabilities, and little or no understanding of our limitations and restrictions. On the other hand, the US military personnel did not realize that those organizations do not have a real chain of command as we are used to — we simply never had any idea who to listen to . . . and they lacked one voice that could speak for all subordinates.”

SOURCE: Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Review,
Headquarters, United States European Command

8. Building Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

~~a. Harnessing the power of disparate organizations with competing priorities and procedures is a daunting task. Accordingly, many agencies and organizations often operate employing ‘management,’ ‘direction,’ or ‘coordination’ rather than ‘command.’ While Chapter III, “Organizing for Successful Interagency Operations,” of this publication details organizing for successful interagency operations, t~~The following basic steps support an orderly and systematic approach to building and maintaining coordination:

~~(1)a. Define the Problem in Clear and Unambiguous Terms.~~ Differences in individual assumptions and organizational perspectives can often cloud a clear understanding of the problem. Appropriate R~~representatives~~ from ~~each major group of relevant~~ agencies, departments, and organizations, to include field offices, should be involved in ~~all levels of appropriate~~ planning from the outset. ~~These representatives are especially important in order to achieve unity of effort during this problem definition phase. The early development of options for interagency consideration is necessary. This may include the deployment of These options may be developed by creating an interagency assessment team capable of quick dispatch to the crisis area to work with the combatant commander, ambassador(s), or local and state authorities, to assess the situation.~~

~~(2)b. Define-Understand the Objectives, End State, and Transition Criteria for Each Involved Organization or Agency.~~ Within the context of interagency operations, e~~Commanders~~ and decision makers should seek a clearly defined end state supported by attainable objectives and transition criteria. ~~Successful interagency coordination is essential to achieve these goals and to develop accurate and timely assessments. Such definition allows application of resources from the most appropriate agencies. Not all agencies and organizations will necessarily understand or agree to clearly define the objective with the same sense of urgency or specificity of military planners.~~ For example, the DOS may appear to resist defining a set of concrete objectives, ~~as since~~ this ~~may can~~ inhibit the give and take necessary to resolve the political problems that are associated with many operations. From the DOS viewpoint, the objective may emerge clearly only in the course of political negotiations and may not be established in complete detail beforehand.

c. Understand the Differences Between US National Objectives, End State and Transition Criteria and Those of IGOs and NGOs. Although appropriate IGOs and NGOs may participate at some level in defining the problem, ultimately their goals and objectives are independent of our own.

~~(3)d. Establish a Common Frame of Reference.~~ ~~The interagency environment is complicated by d~~Differences in terminology and ~~— in the case of foreign organizations —~~ the use of English as a second language complicate coordination. The meaning of the terms “safe zone” or “neutral” to a JFC may have completely different connotations to another agency representative. The operational impact of this potential for misunderstanding is grave. The semantic differences commonly experienced among the Services grows markedly in the interagency, NGO, and IGO arenas. To mitigate this problem, commanders and their staffs must

1 anticipate confusion and take measures to clarify and establish common terms with clear and
2 specific usage. A good start is to provide common access to JP 1-02, *Department of Defense*
3 *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*. This clarification is particularly important to the
4 establishment of military objectives. ~~Different operating procedures, bureaucratic cultures, and~~
5 ~~language differences can create similar problems during multinational operations.~~

6
7 **(4)e. Develop Courses of Action (COAs) or Options.** These should address the problem
8 and achieve the objectives. **Commanders and their staffs should focus their efforts on the**
9 **military enabling capabilities that contribute to national security policy objective**
10 **attainment and are part of the interagency plan of action.** Resource-sensitive problems
11 require flexible and viable options to lead to good solutions. Providing too few or clearly
12 impractical options or recommending the “middle of the road” approach merely for the sake of
13 achieving consensus is of little service to decision makers. Open debate within the interagency
14 community facilitates the formulation of viable options. Cooperation and synchronization are
15 achieved when interagency coordination allows consideration of all positions. The military
16 planner or commander’s voice ~~may will~~ be but one among many at the interagency table.

17
18 **(5)f. Capitalize on Experience.** Review the after action reports and lessons learned using
19 the Joint ~~and Services Universal Lessons Learned Systems~~ ~~or the Center for Army Lessons~~
20 ~~Learned, the Navy Lessons Learned System, the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System, Air~~
21 ~~Force Center for Knowledge Sharing, US Coast Guard Standing After Action Information and~~
22 ~~Lesson Learned System~~ (<http://lintra.comdt.useg.mil>), and the US Army Peacekeeping ~~and~~
23 ~~Stability Operations~~ Institute to assess proposed COAs and to reduce the requirement to relearn
24 on the job. Although usually less formal, agencies outside DOD frequently have their own
25 systems in place to capitalize on operational experience which should be reviewed whenever
26 possible.

27
28 **(6)g. Establish Responsibility.** A common sense of ownership and commitment
29 toward resolution is achievable ~~When all participants in the interagency process~~
30 ~~understand what needs to be done, and agree upon the means to accomplish it, and~~
31 ~~identify who will do what through policy operations coordination. A common sense of~~
32 ~~ownership and commitment toward resolution will help achieve unity of effort.~~ The
33 resources required for a mission must be painstakingly identified, with specific and agreed upon
34 responsibility assigned to the agencies that will provide them. To receive proper reimbursement
35 from other USG agencies ~~or IGOs~~ for materiel support, **careful responsibility and accounting**
36 **procedures should be established.**

37
38 *See JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint*
39 *Operations.*

40
41 **(7)h. Plan for the Transition of Key Responsibilities, Capabilities, and Functions.** In
42 most multi-agency operations, civilian organizations will remain engaged long after the military
43 has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the area of operations. ~~Therefore, P~~prior to
44 employing military forces, **it is imperative to plan for the transition of responsibility for**
45 **specific actions or tasks from military to nonmilitary entities.** This planning process must

begin at the national level. When interagency transition planning (including assignment of specific responsibilities and timelines for accomplishment) does not occur, military involvement may be needlessly protracted. **As campaign and operation plans and orders are developed, effective transition planning should also be a primary consideration.** ~~Particularly during MOOTW, c~~Commanders and their staffs should anticipate the impact of transition on the local populace and other organizations.

Recent positive examples illustrate this point; in Rwanda, the provision of potable water was critical to saving thousands of lives. While the ~~US~~-Armed Forces of the United States perhaps have the greatest capacity to purify water, this service could not be provided indefinitely. Effective interagency coordination enabled the identification of other sources of reverse osmosis water purification units, associated equipment, support funding, and mutually agreed-upon timelines and procedures for transitioning from military support to NGO and IGO control. In Haiti the well-conceived transition planning, performed as part of overall interagency coordination, provided for superb transition execution and management. This transition enabled the ~~US~~-Armed Forces of the United States to hand over responsibility for key tasks to other agencies, departments, and organizations in a virtually seamless manner.

~~(8)~~**i. Direct All Means Toward Unity of Effort.** Because DOD will often be in a supporting and not in the lead or supported role in this process, it may not be responsible for determining the mission or specifying the participating agencies. Lead agency responsibility is situationally dependent, with the NSC staff setting the agenda for and normally designating the lead agency for situations in which DOD will participate. **While not immutable, the principle of lead agency is applied to a variety of functions requiring interagency coordination.** Application of the principle is not limited to national-level coordination. It can be applied at the lowest governmental level with counterpart agencies such as government field offices and local law enforcement agencies (LEAs). It is important to determine details about the agencies and organizations that have an active role in the issue at hand to ensure the reciprocal exchange of information.

9. Media Impact on Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

The media can be a powerful force in shaping public attitudes and policy development. The media often has a dramatic influence on the interagency process — whether at the strategic decision-making level of the NSC or in the field as NGOs and IGOs vie for public attention and necessary charitable contributions. **Commanders and their staffs should consider the impact that public affairs (PA) and media relations have on the operation and in the interagency process.** ~~The USG-White House Office of Global Communications is will be the lead agency in-for~~ developing the national communication strategy. **Commanders and their staffs should plan for PA activities to function in coordination with national-level communication initiatives.** All participating agencies and organizations need to establish and agree on procedures for media access, issuing and verifying credentials, and briefing, escorting, and transporting of media members and their equipment early in the planning

1 process. Planners must include the development of PA guidance as part of the interagency
2 coordination before executing the plan. This guidance provides a common reference for all
3 military and other governmental organizations. Responsibility for interaction with the media
4 should be established clearly so that, to the extent possible, the media hears a constant theme.
5 ~~Planners~~ Commanders should identify appropriate spokespeople to address the media. Plans
6 should include when, how, and from which locations spokespeople will address media.
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CHAPTER II

ESTABLISHED INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION RELATIONSHIPS

“What’s the relationship between a just-arrived military force and the NGOs and PVOs that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.”

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. Interagency Connectivity

~~Response-Responding~~ to the challenges facing the nation ~~today most often almost inevitably~~ requires a multi-agency, interdisciplinary approach that brings the many diverse skills and resources of the federal government and other public and private organizations to bear. The requirement for coordination between these agencies and organizations is not new. The continually changing global ~~civil-military-security~~ environment ~~calls for requires~~ increased and improved ~~organizational-connectivity-communications and coordination~~ between ~~the numerous~~ agencies ~~and organizations performing their roles as part of all the instruments of national power working~~ to achieve ~~established~~ national security objectives. This cooperation is best achieved through active interagency involvement, building on the core competencies and successful experiences of each. What follows is a discussion of the foundation and beginnings of the interagency process within the federal government, flowing downward and outward to the state and local governments, and combatant commands. The discussion then addresses ~~the~~ ~~interagency~~-coordination with ~~public-and-private~~ national and international NGOs and ~~IGOs~~. While portions of this chapter are described in other JPs, this material is brought together here to provide a common frame of reference that reflects all levels of interagency involvement.

2. Historical Basis of the Interagency Process

a. **DOD participation in the interagency process is grounded within the Constitution and established by law in the National Security Act of 1947 (NSA 47).** The NSC is a product of NSA 47. NSA 47 codified and refined the interagency process used during World War II, modeled in part on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 1919 proposal for a “Joint Plan-Making Body” to deal with the overlapping authorities of the Departments of State, War, and Navy.

b. ~~Reinforced by Due to~~ the ~~parochial-diverse~~ interests of individual agencies, previous efforts at interagency coordination ~~have~~-failed for lack of national-level perspectives, a staff for continuity, and adequate ~~understanding-appreciation~~ of the need for ~~the-an institutionalized coordination~~ process. Evolving from the World War II experience (during which the Secretary of State was not invited to War Council meetings), the first State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee was formed in 1945.

c. From the earliest days of this nation, the President has had the primary responsibility for national security. **The intent of NSA 47 was to assist the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security.** Most current USG interagency actions flow from these beginnings.

1 d. Within the constitutional and statutory system, interagency actions at the national level
2 may be based on both personality and process, consisting of persuasion, negotiation, and
3 consensus building, as well as adherence to bureaucratic procedure.

4 5 **3. The National Security Council System**

6
7 a. The functions, membership, and responsibilities of the NSC and its advisory bodies set
8 forth in NSA 47 (as amended) were updated most recently on February 13, 2001 in NSPD-1,
9 Subject: Organization of the National Security Council System. **These documents establish**
10 **the National Security Council as the principal forum** to advise the President with respect to
11 the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security and the
12 National Security Council System (NSCS) as the process to coordinate executive departments
13 and agencies in the effective development and implementation of those national security
14 policies.

15
16 b. **NSC Functions.** The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of
17 national security policy — domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economics (in
18 conjunction with the National Economic Council ~~and the Office of Homeland Security~~).
19 Together with supporting interagency working groups (some permanent and others ad hoc),
20 high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, **the NSCS provides the**
21 **foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of**
22 **national security policy. The NSC is the President's principal forum for considering**
23 **national security and foreign policy matters with his senior national security advisors and**
24 **cabinet officials. The Council also serves as the President's principal arm for coordinating**
25 **these policies among various government agencies.**

26
27 c. **NSC Membership. The President chairs the NSC.** As prescribed in NSPD-1, the NSC shall have
28 as its regular attendees (both statutory and non-statutory) the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of
29 State, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Defense ~~(SecDef)~~, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
30 and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Director of Central Intelligence and the
31 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ~~(JCS)~~, as statutory advisors to the NSC, shall also attend NSC
32 meetings. The Chief of Staff to the President and the Assistant to the President for Economic Policy are
33 invited to attend any NSC meeting. The Counsel to the President shall be consulted regarding the agenda of
34 NSC meetings, and shall attend any meeting when, in consultation with the Assistant to the President for
35 National Security Affairs, he deems it appropriate. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of
36 Management and Budget shall be invited to attend meetings pertaining to their responsibilities. For the
37 Attorney General, this includes matters both within the jurisdiction of the Justice Department and concerning
38 questions of law. The heads of other executive departments and agencies, as well as other senior officials,
39 shall be invited to attend meetings of the NSC when appropriate.

40
41 d. **NSC Organization. The members of the NSC constitute the President's personal**
42 **and principal staff for national security issues.** The council tracks and directs the
43 development, execution, and implementation of national security policies for the President but
44 does not normally implement policy. Rather, it takes a central, coordinating, or monitoring role
45 in the development of policy and options depending on the desires of the President and the
46 National Security Advisor. **NSPD-1 ~~identifies-establishes~~ three primary-levels of formal**

~~interagency advisory bodies within the NSCS as the forum for consideration of committees~~
for coordinating and making decisions on national security issues. Participation among USG
agencies in the NSCS and these advisory bodies is depicted in Figure II-1. The advisory bodies
include the following:

(1) **The NSC Principals Committee (NSC/PC) is the senior Cabinet level interagency forum** for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The Principals Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the National Security Advisor.

(2) **The NSC/Deputies Committee (NSC/DC) is the senior sub-Cabinet-level (deputy secretary level) interagency forum** for consideration of policy issues affecting national security. The NSC/DC prescribes and reviews the work of the NSC Policy Coordination Committees (NSC/PCCs). The NSC/DC ensures that NSC/PC issues have been properly analyzed and prepared for discussion. The Deputies Committee meets at the call of and is chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor.

(3) **NSC/PCCs are the main day-to-day fora for interagency coordination of national security policy.** NSC/PCCs manage the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG, provide policy analysis for consideration by the more senior committees of the NSCS, and ensure timely responses to decisions made by the President. The oversight of ongoing operations assigned by the Deputies Committee is

PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SYSTEM ACTIVITIES					
N S C S Y S T E M	PARTICIPANTS				
	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	JOINT STAFF	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCH	
	NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT, DIR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE (DCI), NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, US REP TO UN, SEC OF TREAS, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ET AL
	PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE	SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	SECRETARY OF STATE	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, DCI, US REP TO UN, ASST FOR ECONOMIC POLICY, ET AL
	DEPUTIES COMMITTEE	DEPUTY SECRETARY OR UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY	VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF	DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE	NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR TO THE VICE PRESIDENT, OTHER DEPUTIES
POLICY COORDINATION COMMITTEES	REPRESENTATIVES FROM THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS, OFFICES, AND AGENCIES REPRESENTED IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL/DEPUTIES COMMITTEE.				

Figure II-1. Participation in National Security Council System Activities

performed by the appropriate NSC/PCCs, which may create subordinate working groups. Each NSC/PCC is chaired by an official of Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary rank ~~designated by the Secretary of State~~. Each NSC/PCC includes representatives from the executive departments, and offices and agencies represented in the NSC/DC. Additional NSC/PCCs may be established as appropriate by the President or the National Security Advisor.

(a) **Six Regional NSC/PCCs are established for the following regions:** Europe and Eurasia, Western Hemisphere, East Asia, South Asia, Near East and North Africa, and Africa.

(b) **Functional NSC/PCCs are established for specific purposes as issues or crises arise and to develop long-term strategies.** Currently there are 21 functional NSC/PCCs (see Figure II-2). Of particular significance in CCOs is the NSC/PCC for Contingency Planning, ~~that~~ which manages the interagency process for preparation and review of POLMIL plans. Functional NSC/PCCs have an Executive Secretary from the staff of the NSC. The functional NSC/PCC may invite representatives of other executive departments and agencies (see Figure II-3).

(c) **During a rapidly developing crisis,** the President may request the National Security Advisor to convene the NSC. The NSC reviews the situation, determines a preliminary COA, and tasks the Principals and Deputies Committees.

(d) **Under more routine conditions, concerns focus on broader aspects of national policy and long-term strategy perspectives.** NSPDs outline specific national interests, overall national policy objectives, and tasks for the appropriate components of the executive branch.

e. DOD Role in the NSCS

(1) **Key DOD players in the NSCS come from within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff.** The Secretary of Defense is a regular member of the NSC and the NSC/PC. The Deputy Secretary of Defense is a member of the NSC/DC. In addition to membership, an Under Secretary of Defense may chair a NSC/PCC.

(2) **The NSCS is the channel for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to discharge substantial statutory responsibilities as the principal military advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the NSC.** The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regularly attends NSC meetings and provides advice and views in this capacity. **The other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may submit advice or an opinion in disagreement with that of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff** or advice or an opinion in addition to the advice provided by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(3) The Military Departments which implement but do not participate directly in national security policy-making activities of the interagency process are represented by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.



Figure II-2. National Security Council Organization

INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS IN SUPPORT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL (NSC)/ POLICY COORDINATING COMMITTEES (PCC'S) AND ASSOCIATED INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUPS (AS OF 24 APRIL 2001)

Regional PCC's (all chaired by DOS)

<p>A. NEAR EAST AND NORTH AFRICA</p> <p><i>Iraq Ad Hoc Group</i></p> <p><i>Iraq Interagency Working Group (IWG) (SVTC)</i></p> <p><i>Iraq Pub. Dip. Work. Group</i></p> <p><i>Iraq War Crimes Work Group</i></p>	<p>Great Lakes IWG</p> <p>Congo IWG</p> <p>African Crisis Resp. Initiat. IWG</p> <p>W. Afr. Info Prog. Group</p> <p>Sudan Ad Hoc IWG</p> <p>W. Africa Subgroup</p>	<p>B. AFRICA</p> <p><i>E. Africa/Horn Subgroup</i></p> <p><i>So. Africa Subgroup</i></p> <p><i>Central Africa Subgroup</i></p> <p><i>War Prevent. IWG</i></p> <p><i>Econ and Trade Aff. IWG</i></p> <p><i>Demobil IWG</i></p> <p><i>Human Capacity Dev. and Training IWG</i></p>	<p>C. EAST ASIA</p> <p>D. SOUTH ASIA</p> <p>E. WESTERN HEMISPHERE</p> <p>F. EUROPE AND EURASIA</p> <p><i>Balkans IWG (SVTC)</i></p> <p><i>Bosnia IWG (SVTC)</i></p> <p><i>IWG on Jud. Reform and Rule of Law in Bosnia</i></p> <p><i>WG on CIU Anti-Crime Unit in Kosovo</i></p>
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Functional PCC's (chaired by agency noted: NSC (N), Econ. Adv. (E), DOS (S), DOT (T), DOD (D), HHS (H))

<p>G. DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS (N)</p> <p><i>IWG on Improving UN CIVPOL in Peace Operations</i></p> <p><i>International Public Info Core Group</i></p> <p>H. INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE (S)</p> <p>I. GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT (N/E)</p> <p>J. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE (T)</p> <p>K. TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC ISSUES (E)</p> <p>L. DEFENSE STRATEGY, FORCE STRUCTURE, AND PLANNING (D)</p> <p><i>IA Excess Defense Article Coord. Committee</i></p> <p>M. ARMS CONTROL (N)</p> <p><i>Nuc. Test. Verif. and Mon TF</i></p> <p><i>SCC Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>JCIC Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>SVC Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>Erop. Conv. A/C Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>Multilat. A/C Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>Small Arms/ Lt Weapons Backstopping Group</i></p> <p><i>Verif. and Comp. Anal Work. Group for START, INF, CFE</i></p>	<p>N. PROLIFERATION, COUNTERPROLIFERATION, AND HOMELAND DEFENSE (N)</p> <p><i>Missile Trade Anal. Group</i></p> <p><i>Missile Tech. Exp. continue. Group</i></p> <p><i>Shield CBW Cont. Group</i></p> <p><i>Nuc. Interdict. Act. Group</i></p> <p><i>Tech. Transfer Work Group</i></p> <p><i>Export Control Assist. IWG</i></p> <p><i>Nonprolif. Intell. Roundtable</i></p> <p><i>Nuc. Smuggl. IA Response Group</i></p> <p><i>Subgroup on Nuc Ex/ Coord.</i></p> <p><i>IAEA Steering Comm.</i></p> <p><i>Nonprol. and A/C Tech. Work Group</i></p> <p><i>Verif. and Comp. Atrial Work Group for CWC, ABM, BWC</i></p> <p><i>Missilie Material Cutoff Verif. Experts Group</i></p> <p>O. INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (N)</p> <p>P. COUNTERTERRORISM, NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS (N)</p> <p>Q. RECORDS ACCESS, INFORMATION SECURITY (N)</p> <p><i>National Industrial Security Prog. Pol. Advis. Comm.</i></p> <p><i>IA Security Classification App. Pan.</i></p> <p><i>Public Interest Declass. Board</i></p> <p><i>Nazi War Cri. and Jap. Imper. Gov. Rec. IWG</i></p> <p>R. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME (N)</p> <p>S. CONTINGENCY PLANNING (N)</p> <p>T. SPACE (N)</p> <p>U. HIV/AIDS, DISEASES (S,H)</p>
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NOTE:

Trade Policy Staff Committee works for the Trade Policy Review Group (not a PCC).

Lawyers Work Group and Covert Action Work. Group report to NSC/DC

A/C	Aircraft	HHS	Health and Human Services
ABM	Antiballistic Missile	IA	Interagency
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention	IAEA	International Atomic Energy Organization
CBW	Chemical and Biological Warfare	INF	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe	JCIC	Joint Compliance and Inspection Committee
CI	Counterintelligence	SCC	Security Classification Code
CIU	Criminal Investigations Unit	START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
CIVPOL	Civilian Police	SVC	Services
CWC	Composite Warfare Commander	SVTC	Secure Video Teleconference
DOD	Department of Defense	TF	Task Force
DOS	Department of State	UN	United Nations
DOT	Department of Transportation	WG	Working Group
DC	Deputies Committee		

Figure II-3. Interagency Working Groups in Support of the National Security Council

1 f. **The Joint Staff Role in the NSCS**

2
3 (1) **The Joint Staff provides operational input and staff support through the**
4 **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (or designee) for policy decisions made by the Office**
5 **of the Secretary of Defense.** It coordinates with the combatant commands, Services, and other
6 agencies and prepares appropriate directives, such as warning, alert, and execute orders, for
7 Secretary of Defense approval. This preparation includes definition of command and
8 interagency relationships.

9
10 (2) When ~~military activities~~ combatant commands require interagency
11 coordination, the Joint Staff in concert with the Office of the Secretary of Defense routinely
12 accomplishes that coordination.

13
14 (3) **Within the Joint Staff, the offices of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,**
15 **Secretary of the Joint Staff, and the Operations (J-3), Logistics (J-4), Plans and Policy (J-**
16 **5), and Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorates are focal points for**
17 **NSC-related actions.** The J-3 provides advice on execution of military operations, the J-4
18 assesses logistic implications of contemplated operations, and the J-5 often serves to focus DOD
19 on a particular NSC matter for policy and planning purposes. Each of the Joint Staff directorates
20 coordinates with the Military Departments to solicit Service input in the planning process. The
21 Secretary of Defense may also designate one of the Services as the executive agent for direction
22 and coordination of DOD activities in support of specific mission areas.

23
24 g. **The Combatant Commanders' Role in the NSCS.** ~~While the combatant commanders~~
25 ~~function under the Secretary of Defense in accordance with the Unified Command Plan, the~~
26 ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff represents the concerns of the combatant commanders in~~
27 ~~the NSCS. These concerns are determined through direct communications between the~~
28 ~~Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders and their respective staffs.~~
29 ~~Just as the Joint Staff routinely deals with intradepartmental issues, the formulation of military~~
30 ~~advice and the representation of combatant command concerns will be accomplished by~~
31 ~~members of the Joint Staff through coordination with the combatant command.~~ Combatant
32 commanders may communicate with the Deputies Committee during development of the
33 POLMIL plan via with the Joint Staff in a coordinating role ~~between strategic and operational-~~
34 ~~level planning.~~

35
36 **4. Federal Interagency Coordination: ~~Domestic Operations~~ Civil Support**

37
38 a. The US military ~~often~~ provides ~~support assistance~~ to civil authorities on a routine basis.
39 While the most visible support occurs during domestic emergencies or major disasters, ~~or the~~
40 majority of DOD's support is in support of civilian law enforcement or intelligence agencies.
41 This ~~response capability assistance~~ is known as civil support (CS) within the defense community
42 because the assistance – ~~When the military responds to emergencies or major disasters, it~~
43 will always be in support of a LFA, ~~and as many as 9 other federal agencies in accordance~~
44 ~~with the FRP.~~ The ~~r~~Requests for ~~CS assistance~~ from the LFA another agency may be
45 predicated on mutual agreements between agencies or stem from ~~follow~~ a Presidential

1 designation of a Federal Disaster Area or a Federal State of Emergency. The military typically
2 only responds after and include the efforts and resources of other federal agencies, state and
3 local governments, and NGOs have been exhausted or when unique military assets are required.
4

5 b. Authorities and funding are the main trigger points for the approval of military support to
6 civil authorities. DOD policy for support and assistance to state and local governments during
7 emergencies, disasters, or civil disturbances is set forth in DOD Directives (DODDs) 3025.1,
8 Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA), 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil
9 Disturbances (MACDIS), 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities (MACA), and 5525.5,
10 DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials.
11

12 c. The Department of Defense works closely with other Federal agencies in various
13 domestic arenas. In addition to participating in interagency steering groups and councils, DOD
14 is a partner in several national level incident management and emergency response plans such as
15 the Federal Response Plan, the National Contingency Plan, the Federal Radiological Emergency
16 Response Plan (FRERP), the United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism
17 Concept of Operations Plan (CONPLAN), Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, and the National
18 Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP). Over time, these plans will
19 be consolidated into a National Response Plan.
20

21 b.-(1) The Federal Response Plan, January 2003, is the most well-known national
22 interagency plan of which DOD is a signatory. The FRP invokes the The Robert T. Stafford
23 Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act which provides the authority for the federal
24 government to respond to emergencies and major disasters. The Act gives the President the
25 authority to establish a program for disaster preparedness and response support which is
26 delegated to the FEMA.
27

28 ~~(1) Following a request for assistance from the Governor of the affected state or~~
29 ~~territory, and the determination that local ability to respond has been exceeded, the President~~
30 ~~implements the FRP by declaring an emergency or major disaster. The FRP provides the~~
31 ~~framework for coordinating the military support to civil authorities. With this Presidential~~
32 ~~declaration, the resources of the federal government, through the interagency process, are~~
33 ~~available for support operations.~~
34

35 JOINT TASK FORCE ANDREW

36
37 ~~At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and~~
38 ~~caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal~~
39 ~~assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President's executive agent,~~
40 ~~directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal~~
41 ~~response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces~~
42 ~~Command, directed the Second US Army to form joint task force (JTF)~~
43 ~~Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of~~
44 ~~elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew~~
45 ~~began operations on 28 August 1992.~~
46

~~JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations.~~

~~JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations. This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.~~

VARIOUS SOURCES

~~(2) The FRP groups the types of assistance needed during a civil emergency or disaster into 12 emergency support functions (ESFs). Based on core competencies, federal agencies are selected to contribute to ESFs; lead agents are designated as primary agencies while others participate as support agencies. For example, DOD is the primary agency for ESF-3, "Public Works and Engineering," and a support agency for the 11 other functions. DOD has designated the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as its operating agent for ESF-3. As the operating agent, the USACE is responsible for planning, preparedness, response, and recovery.~~

~~(3) Under the FRP, an approved request for assistance that cannot be met by the ESF's primary agency may be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for assessment. The Secretary of Defense may issue an executive order instructing the appropriate combatant commander to provide the requested support.~~

~~e. DOD policy for support and assistance to state and local governments during emergencies, disasters, or civil disturbances is set forth in DOD Directives (DODDs) 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities* (MSCA), 3025.12, *Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances* (MACDIS), 3025.15, *Military Assistance to Civil Authorities* (MACA), and 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*.~~

~~d. The Secretary of Defense determined that certain chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosive (CBRNE) situations may be qualitatively and quantitatively different than other situations, and DOD response might require special management procedures and channels. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has the responsibility to determine whether or not the CBRNE situation warrants special management. If so, the Joint Staff will translate the Secretary of Defense decision into military orders for those CBRNE events, under the oversight of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict). If not, the Secretary of the~~

1 Army will exercise authority as the DOD Executive Agent through the normal Director of Military Support
2 (DOMS) military support to civil authorities (MSCA) procedures.

3
4 **e. During emergency or disaster relief operations, DOD, in coordination with FEMA, generally**
5 **supports Federal agencies that have primary ESF responsibility in the FRP.** This coordination is
6 effected between the defense coordinating officer (DCO) and the Federal coordinating officer (FCO). The
7 DCO is the DOD on-scene military point of contact (POC) with FEMA. The FCO is FEMA's focal point for
8 DOD liaison.

9
10 (2) The FRERP, May 1, 1996. The FRERP remains the plan that establishes an organized and
11 integrated capability for timely, coordinated response by Federal agencies to peacetime radiological
12 emergencies. The LFA is responsible for coordinating all aspects of the Federal response. The DOD is the
13 LFA for emergencies at DOD owned or operated facilities, involving DOD material in transit, or involving
14 DOD spacecraft missions. Additionally, DOD provides radiological resources to include trained response
15 personnel, specialized radiation instruments, mobile instrument calibration, repair capabilities, expertise in site
16 restoration and performs special sampling of airborne contamination on request.

17
18 (3) Under The United States Government Interagency Domestic Terrorism CONPLAN, January
19 2001, DOD will provide military assistance to the LFA and/or the CONPLAN primary agencies during all
20 aspects of a terrorist incident when requested by the appropriate authority and approved by the Secretary of
21 Defense.

22
23 (4) Operation Distant Shore, Mass Immigration Emergency Plan, June 1994, presents guidelines
24 for a coordinated effort by the Federal government, at the national, regional, and local level, to enforce
25 Federal laws to deter, interdict, and control massive illegal immigration to the United States. The DOD will
26 provide facilities, logistics, medical support, transportation and personnel support to agencies involved in the
27 implementation of the plan.

28
29 (5) The NCP, September 15, 1994 provides the organizational structure and procedures for
30 preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and
31 contaminants. In the case of a release of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant, where the release
32 is on, or the sole source of the release is from, any facility or vessel under the jurisdiction, custody, or control
33 of DOD, then DOD will be the lead agency.

34
35 d. Military forces may also conduct missions to help the DOJ or other Federal LEAs assist Federal,
36 state, or local LEAs. Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) includes military
37 assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of operations that typically require MSCLEA are, counterdrug,
38 combatting terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical asset
39 assurance. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues
40 all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests for MSCLEA
41 should be coordinated with the supporting organization's legal counsel or Staff Judge Advocate
42 (SJA). Examples of laws that may impact MSCLEA include:

43
44 (1) The Posse Comitatus Act and DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law*
45 *Enforcement Authorities*, provide the authority and define the conditions under which military
46 forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to

1 prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the US Coast Guard
2 (USCG) and members of the National Guard in state service, military personnel are normally
3 prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the
4 execution of civil laws in the United States. Under the provisions of this act and DOD policy,
5 military personnel are prohibited from:

6
7 (a) Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or domestic
8 interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.

9
10 (b) Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit.

11
12 (c) Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal
13 cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.

14
15 (2) Preplanned national events may be perceived by adversaries as terrorist targets.
16 Under PDD 62, the NSC, upon the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and the
17 Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the
18 2002 Winter Olympics or the President's Inauguration, as National Security Special Events.
19 Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the LFA may
20 request support from the DOD.

21
22 ~~fe. Acting through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense~~
23 ~~approves an execute order designating~~ In most situations, the Commander, United States
24 Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) or the Commander, United States Pacific Command
25 (USPACOM) will be designated as the supported combatant commander.

26
27 **(1) The supported combatant commanders are DOD principal planning agents**
28 **and have the responsibility to provide joint planning and execution directives for peacetime**
29 **assistance rendered by DOD within their assigned areas of responsibility (AORs).**

30
31 (2) Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses
32 the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of the joint force will be
33 based on the capabilities required for the optimum response to the disaster. Frequently, the response will
34 require nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources.

35
36 (23) During disaster operations, ~~T~~the supported combatant commander **normally** designates
37 a component command or joint task force (JTF) as a HQ to execute the **relief operations**. Upon
38 issuance of the SecDef deployment order, this HQ will appoint and deploy a defense coordinating officer
39 (DCO) and a multifunctional staff of officers referred to as the defense coordinating element. The DCO
40 works with the federal coordinating officer (FCO) to integrate DOD efforts in support of the operation and
41 serves as the on-scene military ~~(POC)-~~ point of contact (POC) for the FCO and principal representatives of
42 other USG agencies and NGOs.

43 ~~(3) Within the continental United States, USNORTHCOM, based upon a SecDef~~
44 ~~approved DEPORD, through the Army Component Forces Command or a Continental~~
45 ~~United States Army (CONUSA), can provide a JTF HQ. The CONUSAs are regionally~~

oriented. These HQ interact daily with state and local authorities, FEMA regions, and other Federal agencies on a variety of issues that provide a foundation for rapid and smooth transition to support operations during periods of disaster response. The Commander, United States Army Forces Command, is designated as Army Service component commander to USNORTHCOM. United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) retains combatant command (command authority) of continental United States-based Army forces. Also, USNORTHCOM can appoint Joint Force Headquarters-Homeland Security (JFHQ-HLS) to provide the JTF HQ.

(4) FEMA provides supporting combatant commanders with interface to Federal agencies through Regional Interagency Steering Committees for planning, coordinating, and supporting relief efforts. **Figure II-4 depicts the incident command system (ICS), a standard model for managing domestic events, and widely used by the civilian sector and FEMA to establish roles and responsibilities when working within the interagency community.** The US Coast Guard (USCG) has adopted ICS as its standard response system for nonmilitary incident management. US military forces that might be involved in emergency or major disaster operations may benefit by becoming familiar with the ICS system.




Figure II-4. Incident Command System/Unified Command

Joint Task Force Los Angeles (JTF-LA) was formed following a Presidential Executive Order on the evening of 1 May 1992. The Executive Order federalized units of the California National Guard (CANG) and authorized active military forces to assist in the restoration of law and order. JTF-LA formed and deployed within twenty-four hours, assembled from US Army and Marine Forces. It operated in a unique domestic disturbance environment, while working with city, county, state, Federal agencies and the CANG.

VARIOUS SOURCES

~~gf. In addition to emergency or disaster assistance, DOD assistance may be requested from other agencies as part of homeland security. Such assistance may be in the form of information and intelligence sharing, mapping, or a Federal response to domestic environmental disasters. Normally, such assistance will be provided based on requests from the Environmental Protection Agency, the USCG, or Department of the Interior as the lead agency. Examples include flooding and radiological and hazardous material accidents or incidents. USSTRATCOM, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) can utilize space-based sensors to provide significant damage assessment assistance.~~

~~hg. While DOD response to domestic emergencies is normally coordinated through the Secretary of Defense, **the military may also respond when an interdepartmental memorandum of agreement (MOA) is in effect.** For example, the USCG, under an interdepartmental MOA, is assured of a rapid deployment of oil containment and recovery equipment from the US Navy. The MOA bypasses negotiations at the HQ level and sets forth procedures for deployment and employment of equipment and personnel and for reimbursement of operational costs. This mechanism enabled the rapid deployment of Navy equipment to Prince William Sound in 1989 in response to the Exxon Valdez incident and preceded the much greater DOD assistance effort orchestrated by DOMS.~~

~~i. **Military forces may also conduct missions to help the DOJ or other Federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs) assist Federal, state, or local LEAs.** Military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) includes military assistance for civil disturbances. Other types of operations that typically require MSCLEA are counterdrug, combatting terrorism, general support such as training civilian law enforcement officials, and critical asset assurance. However, the Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues all affect the employment of the military in domestic operations. For this reason, requests for MSCLEA should be coordinated with the supporting organization's legal counsel or Staff Judge Advocate. Examples of laws that may impact MSCLEA include:~~

~~(1) The Posse Comitatus Act and DODD 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Authorities*, provide the authority and define the conditions under which military forces can be employed, as well as criminal penalties and the legal constraints intended to prevent misuse of military force. With the exception of members of the USCG and members of the National Guard in state service, **military personnel are normally prohibited under either the Posse Comitatus Act or DOD policy from direct participation in the execution of civil**~~

~~laws in the United States. The two geographically oriented Joint Interagency Task Forces are examples that illustrate military support to civilian law enforcement by bringing together the resources of participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy under a single commander. Otherwise, military personnel are prohibited from:~~

~~(a) Participating in the arrest, search and seizure, stop and frisk, or domestic interdiction of vessels, aircraft, or vehicles.~~

~~(b) Conducting domestic surveillance or pursuit.~~

~~(c) Operating as informants, undercover agents, or investigators in civilian legal cases or in any other civilian law enforcement activity.~~

~~The war on drugs typifies extremely complex US Government interagency coordination. Counterdrug activities of the United States are a coherent national effort of joint military and civilian cooperation. DOD personnel work with more than 30 Federal agencies and innumerable state, local, and private authorities. The DOD has responsibility as the lead Federal Agency in support of law enforcement agencies for the detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipment into the United States. Combatant commanders have responsibility within their respective areas of responsibility to develop strategy for detection and monitoring of land, aerial and maritime modes of drug transportation. Joint interagency task forces bring together the resources of participating agencies for execution of the counterdrug strategy. The Services contribute to the counterdrug effort by providing personnel and equipment support to the combatant commanders for the range of DOD missions.~~

VARIOUS SOURCES

~~(2) Preplanned national events may be perceived by adversaries as opportunities for the employment of CBRNE. Under PDD 62, the NSC, upon the joint recommendation of the Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury, has the authority to designate important public events, such as the 2002 Winter Olympics or the President's Inauguration, as National Security Special Events. Once so designated, an event becomes the focal point for interagency planning and the LFA may request support from DOD.~~

~~jh.~~ Because of America's unrivaled military superiority, **adversaries of the United States may be more likely to resort to terror and the use of CBRNE instead of conventional military methods.** Supporting incidents involving CBRNE may take many forms, to include operations associated with crisis management (CrM) and consequence management (CM).

(1) **Crisis management-CrM support** occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the federal government with the DOJ, exercised through the FBI, as the LFA assuming primary responsibility in a domestic terrorist threat or incident. DOD support to LFA crisis management involving the employment of CBRNE includes measures to identify, acquire, and employ resources to anticipate, prevent, or resolve a threat or act of terrorism.

1
2 (2) **Consequence management** involves ~~measures to alleviate the damage, loss,~~
3 ~~hardship, or suffering caused by CBRNE actions that comprise those essential services and~~
4 ~~activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes,~~
5 ~~including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation,~~
6 ~~communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, urban search and rescue, hazardous~~
7 ~~materials, food and energy.~~ Support occurs under the primary jurisdiction of the affected state
8 and local government with the federal government providing assistance when required. DOD
9 support to CM involving the employment of CBRNE comprises USG interagency assistance to
10 protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency
11 relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a CBRNE
12 accident or incident.

13
14 ~~"The United States shall give the highest priority to developing capabilities to detect,~~
15 ~~prevent, defeat and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological or chemical~~
16 ~~materials or weapons used by terrorists."~~

17
18 **PDD-39, United States Policy on Counterterrorism**
19

20 **ki.** The US military has acquired experience and developed expertise in protecting its
21 members from CBRNE and in operating in a contaminated environment. With the threat now
22 reaching into the domestic arena, this experience and expertise is available to domestic civil
23 authorities. ~~The Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF-CS) is a standing JTF HQ organized~~
24 ~~and trained for a flexible response based on the type of CBRNE incident and support~~
25 ~~requested by the LFA. In its role as the USNORTHCOM standing JTF HQ for CBRNE CM,~~
26 ~~the JTF-CS works closely with FEMA. When directed by the Secretary of Defense and the~~
27 ~~supported combatant commander, DOD forces (less United States Special Operations Command~~
28 ~~and USACE) responding to CBRNE incidents will be attached to JTF-CS.~~
29

30 ~~(1) A wide array of active components, reserve forces, and government civilians and~~
31 ~~contractors are identified to provide CBRNE support to the JTF-CS.~~
32

33 ~~(2) National Guard forces are the Governor's military response organization for~~
34 ~~CBRNE incidents, but may be Federalized and deployed as an element of the JTF-CS.~~
35

36 **lj.** Military commanders should scrutinize, with the assistance of legal counsel when
37 appropriate, each request for domestic aid to ensure that it conforms with statutory
38 limitations, especially in law enforcement assistance to civil authorities. The Secretary of
39 Defense must personally approve any request to assist LEAs in preplanned national events.
40 Increased demand for DOD assets in support of law enforcement will require careful review
41 during the planning phase to ensure that DOD support conforms to legal guidelines and does not
42 degrade the mission capability of combatant commanders.

43
44 ~~"States, terrorists, and other disaffected groups will acquire weapons of mass~~
45 ~~destruction and mass disruption, and some will use them. Americans will likely die on~~
46 ~~American soil, possibly in large numbers."~~
47

US Commission on National Security/21st Century
Chaired by former Senators Gary Hart and Warren Rudman
September 15, 1999

~~m. Once a decision to employ military assets is made, the supported combatant commander uses the capabilities of each component to accomplish the mission. The organization of a JTF will be based on the capabilities required for the optimum response to the disaster. Frequently, the JTF response will require nontraditional or innovative uses of military resources.~~

5. Department of Defense Coordination of ~~Domestic Operations~~ Civil Support with State and Local Authorities

a. When a disaster threatens or occurs, and the assets of local and state governments are fully committed, a governor may request federal assistance. DOD may support local and state authorities in a variety of tasks. **DOD interaction with state and local authorities can take the very visible form of military support to civil authorities (MSCA) or the more routine involvement of commanders of DOD installations with state, county, and municipal governments.** ~~These activities include contingency planning with local governments and field offices of federal agencies and community and social activities. With the increased threat of terrorism, and the possibility that an act of terrorism in the form of CBRNE may very quickly overwhelm the capabilities of many local and state governments, there will be a growing requirement for US military forces to provide increased assistance to state and local governments.~~

b. Army and Air National Guard forces, have primary responsibility for providing military assistance in all 50 states, Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia in civil emergencies, and are under the command of the state or territory adjutant general. Reserve personnel may be employed for civil emergencies in a volunteer status, be ordered to active duty for annual training, or be called to active duty. **DOD support is generally provided in the form of assistance or augmentation of skills and resources to the Federal agency field office or to a state or local agency having responsibility for a particular activity.**

~~"JTF-CS officials were in constant contact with New York's adjutant general throughout the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the World Trade Center. Had they been needed, the JTF-CS could have been on the site almost immediately. New York City had enough resources to handle a tragedy of this scope."~~

Comments by BG Jerry Grizzle
Commander, JTF-CS

c. The Domestic Preparedness Program was established in 1997 and provided funding for DOD to train state and local first responders in 120 US cities in CBRNE training, access to federal assistance, and exercises. ~~The JTF-CS participates by co-sponsoring exercises.~~

d. Each US state, territory, and possession has an office of emergency services (OES) or an equivalent office responsible for preparedness planning and assisting the governor in directing responses to emergencies. The OES coordinates provision of state or territorial assistance to its local governments through authority of the governor or adjutant general. The OES operates the state emergency operations center during

1 a disaster or emergency and coordinates with Federal officials for support, if required. The state will usually
2 designate a state coordinating officer (SCO), with similar authorities to the FCO, to coordinate and integrate
3 Federal and state activities. States may also assist other states through the use of interstate compacts.

4
5 e. DOD counterpart relationships to those of DCO, FCO, and SCO are established at lower echelons to
6 facilitate coordination. ~~For example, local DOD installation commanders may work closely with local~~
7 ~~mayors and commissioners to align capabilities and resources with needs. Installation commanders may~~
8 ~~respond immediately to a request from local or state governments to an emergency which may not be~~
9 ~~at the level to be a Presidential declared emergency.~~ Installation commanders may respond to support for
10 public fire, search and rescue services, public works, police protection, social services, public health, and
11 hospitals. **DOD support for local environmental operations can begin immediately within the**
12 **authority delegated to installation commanders.** ~~One such example is detection of an oil spill in a harbor.~~
13 ~~If requested by local authorities, a commander of a DOD installation having the appropriate resources can~~
14 ~~take immediate action, with coordination of state and Federal activities to follow.~~ This immediate response
15 by commanders will not take precedence over their primary mission. Commanders should seek guidance
16 through the chain of command regarding continuing assistance whenever DOD resources are committed
17 under immediate response circumstances. When providing assistance in response to a Presidential-declared
18 disaster or emergency, Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) represent the DOD executive
19 agent, the supported commander, and their own Service.

20
21 ~~f. Federal support to LEAs can be coordinated with the state or territory adjutant general, the~~
22 ~~OES, or principal LEA, depending on the nature and magnitude of the operation.~~ For example,
23 ~~coordination of counterdrug operations under Federal and state oversight can be very low key, with~~
24 ~~interagency activities taking place within specific localities. In a different sort of operation, support provided~~
25 ~~during the Los Angeles riots required extensive coordination at several echelons, from the adjutant general to~~
26 ~~local law enforcement departments and DOD installations.~~

27
28 g. ~~When providing assistance in response to a Presidential-declared disaster or emergency, Emergency~~
29 ~~Preparedness Liaison Officers (EPLOs) represent the DOD executive agent, the supported commander, and~~
30 ~~their own Service.~~

31 32 **6. Homeland Security**

33
34 a. ~~Following the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the~~
35 ~~Department of Homeland Defense was formed in accordance with HR5005. The primary~~
36 ~~mission of the Department is to:~~ position of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
37 Defense (ASD(HD)) was created. The ASD(HD) is established within the office of the Under
38 Secretary for Policy and provide overall direction and supervision for policy, program planning
39 and execution, and allocation of DOD resources for homeland defense and civil support.
40 Responsibilities include: strategic planning; employment policy, guidance and oversight;
41 support to civil authorities in accordance with the FRP; assistance to civilian agencies
42 conducting homeland security missions; and when directed, serve as the Secretary of Defense's
43 executive agent for homeland defense and homeland security mission areas. The establishment
44 of the ASD(HD) was followed closely by a change in the Unified Command Plan with the
45 creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM assumed missions previously assigned to

1 United States Joint Forces Command and US Element of the North American Aerospace
2 Defense Command.

3
4 For further guidance on civil support and homeland security, see JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for
5 Homeland Security.

6
7 ~~(1) Prevent terrorist attacks within the United States.~~

8
9 ~~(2) Reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism.~~

10
11 ~~(3) Minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do~~
12 ~~occur within the United States.~~

13
14 ~~(4) Carry out all functions of entities transferred to the Department, including by acting~~
15 ~~as a focal point regarding natural and manmade crises and emergency planning.~~

16
17 ~~(5) Ensure that the functions of the agencies and sub-divisions within the Department~~
18 ~~that are not related directly to securing the homeland are not diminished or neglected except by a~~
19 ~~specific explicit Act of Congress.~~

20
21 ~~(6) Ensure that the overall economic security of the United States is not diminished by~~
22 ~~efforts, activities, and programs aimed at securing the homeland.~~

23
24 ~~(7) Monitor connections between illegal drug trafficking and terrorism, coordinate~~
25 ~~efforts to sever such connections, and otherwise contribute to efforts to interdict illegal drug~~
26 ~~trafficking.~~

27
28 ~~b. In concert with this DOD created the office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for~~
29 ~~Homeland Defense and the JFHQ-HLS within the USJFCOM. This was followed closely by a~~
30 ~~change in the Unified Command Plan with the creation of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM~~
31 ~~assumed missions previously assigned to USJFCOM and North American Aerospace Defense~~
32 ~~Command, specifically the air, land, sea, and space **defense of the US. Today military efforts**~~
33 ~~**are effectively united under one unified combatant commander – USNORTHCOM.**~~
34

7. Interagency Coordination: Foreign Operations

a. **The Politico-Military Domain.** Within the Executive Branch, the DOS is the lead US foreign affairs agency. The DOS advises and assists the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. External politico-military relationships of DOD include:

(1) Bilateral and multilateral military relationships.

(2) Treaties and agreements involving other DOD activities or interests, such as: technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, FHA, peace operations (including those conducted under UN auspices), and other contingencies.

b. **Theater Focus.** The combatant commander's regional focus is ~~mirrored~~ paralleled at the DOS in its geographic bureaus. Similarly, many other USG agencies are regionally organized. Within a theater, **the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination.**

c. **In a CCO, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the NSC/PCC and, if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan.** During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the combatant commander's staff may deal directly with an ambassador or members of the country team. In some operations, a Special Representative of the President or Special Envoy of the UN Secretary General may be involved. Within individual countries, the ambassador and country team are the initial focal point.

d. **The ~~J~~oint ~~I~~nteragency ~~C~~oordination ~~G~~roup (JIACG) is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners.** Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the JIACG provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the NSCS. Members participate in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agency links agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with the efforts of civilian USG agencies and departments.

"Interaction with the US Department of State and the United Nations was critical throughout the operation. Ambassador Oakley and I spoke regularly to coordinate the efforts of the DOS and our military operations in the ARFOR [Army forces] sector. His support for our operation was superb and he played a key role in communicating with the leadership of the Somali clans. We followed his lead in operations, just as we fully supported the operations of the DOS."

Major General Steven L. Arnold, USA
*Operations Other Than War in a Power Projection Army:
Lessons From Operation RESTORE HOPE and Hurricane Andrew Relief Operations,
Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1994*

e. **Campaign Planning Within Interagency-~~Operations~~ Coordination.** Campaign planning generally applies to the conduct of combat operations, but combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs may develop campaign plans for ~~MOOTW~~ non-combat operations. A joint campaign plan is based on the commander's concept, which presents a broad vision of the required aim or end state, and how operations will be ~~sequenced and synchronized~~ conducted to achieve objectives. Thus, **a campaign plan is an essential tool for laying out a clear, definable path linking the mission to the desired end state.** Such a plan enables commanders to help political leaders visualize operational requirements for achieving objectives. Given the systematic military approach to problem solving, it is often the combatant commander who formally or informally functions as the lead organizer of many operations.

(1) **Strategic Guidance.** The President and/or Secretary of Defense will promulgate strategic guidance to provide long-term, intermediate, or ancillary objectives. **The combatant commander will determine how to implement guidance at the theater or operational level to achieve strategic objectives.** Theater level campaign planning is linked to operational art, which provides a framework to assist commanders in using resources efficiently and effectively, including interagency assets, when producing campaign plans. Among the many operational considerations, the combatant commander's guidance must define the following:

(a) What military or related political and social conditions (objectives) must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

(b) What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

(c) How should resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

(d) What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing a particular sequence of actions? (Considered during COA analysis).

(2) **To frame the campaign plan within interagency-~~operations~~ coordination, the commander must address these areas in the context of all of the instruments of national power.** The commander will be guided by the interagency provisions of the POLMIL plan, when provided, and by Annex V, Interagency Coordination Annex of the combatant commander's operation plan (OPLAN). The term "end state" represents the set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives. Developed in December 1999, Annex V to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3122.03A, *Planning Guidance - Interagency Coordination*, remains an essential ingredient at the NSC and ~~PCC~~ policy coordinating committee in producing POLMIL plans. For interagency transition and exit criteria Annex V lays out to the greatest degree possible what the combatant commander desires as the entry and exit conditions for the USG civilian agencies during the operation. It notes that interagency participation could be involved at the earliest phases of the operation or campaign starting with flexible deterrent options. Linking the interagency actions with the phases of the operation ~~would help~~ assists in the scheduling and coordination of effort. Crucially important to the plan is the orderly flow of operations to the desired end state and an efficient end of direct US military involvement. The development of Annex V ~~is to~~ should enhance early coordination

1 with planners from the other USG agencies that ~~could be potentially involved in the plan may be~~
2 involved in the operation's execution or its policy context. During deliberate interagency
3 planning, heavy combatant command involvement, participation, and coordination will be ~~the~~
4 key-critical to success.

5
6 f. **Plan Development and Coordination.** Although deliberate planning is conducted in
7 anticipation of future events, **there may be situations which call for an immediate US**
8 **military response, e.g., noncombatant evacuation operation or FHA.** Combatant
9 commanders frequently develop COAs based on recommendations and considerations
10 originating in one or more US embassies. In this regard, the country team is an invaluable
11 resource because of its interagency experience and links to Washington. ~~A-The~~ JIACG, if
12 ~~activated,~~ will provide additional collaboration with operational planners and USG agencies.
13 Emergency action plans in force at every embassy cover a wide range of anticipated
14 contingencies and crises and can assist the commanders in identifying COAs, options, and
15 constraints to military actions and support activities. The staffs of geographic combatant
16 commands also consult with the Joint Staff and other key agencies not represented on the
17 country team or a JIACG to coordinate military operations and support activities. **Initial**
18 **concepts of military operations may require revision based on feasibility analysis and**
19 **consideration of related activities by NGOs or IGOs, particularly regarding logistics.** For
20 example, primitive seaport and airport facilities may limit the ability to move massive amounts
21 of supplies and constrain application of the collective effort. Such information frequently
22 originates within the country team that, in turn, may be in contact with relief organizations in
23 country. Directly or indirectly, refinement of the military mission should be coordinated with
24 other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs to identify and minimize mutual interference.

25
26 (1) **Mission planning** conducted by the geographic combatant commander **should be**
27 **coordinated with the DOS, DOJ, and Department of Energy, through the Office of the Secretary of**
28 **Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff,** to facilitate definition and clarification of strategic aims, end state, and
29 the means to achieve them. Commanders and planners should consider specific conditions that could
30 produce mission failure, as well as those that mark success. Commanders must ensure that unity of effort
31 with other agencies contributes to the USG's overall strategic aims and objectives.

32 33 INTEGRATING INTERAGENCY PLANNING

34
35 **Our experiences in Kosovo and elsewhere have demonstrated the necessity**
36 **to ensure that all concerned government agencies conduct comprehensive**
37 **planning to encompass the full range of instruments available to decision**
38 **makers. We all must move forward with our efforts to achieve increased**
39 **levels of integrated interagency planning now. To better support other**
40 **agencies, DOD needs to give greater consideration to political, diplomatic,**
41 **humanitarian, economic, information, and other nonmilitary activities in**
42 **defense planning. In addition, the US Government must establish dedicated**
43 **mechanisms and integrated planning processes to ensure rapid, effective,**
44 **well-structured, multi-agency efforts in response to crises. Finally, we must**

continue to emphasize that our senior officials routinely participate in rehearsals, gaming, exercises, and simulations, as well as the CP IWG [Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group] - which has become a genuine leap forward in the effort to establish a sound system to incorporate crisis and deliberate planning across the interagency.

SOURCE: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Posture Statement
before the 106th Congress Committee On Armed Services,
United States Senate, 8 February 2000

(2) During campaign planning, the command should identify the target audiences to be reached. The JTF-JFC's public affairs officer (PAO) must coordinate with civil affairs, ~~psychological operations~~, information operations, embassy public affairs officers, the intelligence community, NGOs, and IGOs to develop and deconflict communications strategies and tactics in line with the ~~combatant commander's JFC's~~ intent. **The desired end state, essential tasks leading up to the end state, and exit criteria must be clearly expressed to the US and international media in order to gain and maintain public understanding and support.** USG agencies and organizations must determine and coordinate the best methods to communicate their messages to avoid contradicting each other and present the USG's message coherently.

For a detailed description of these key interagency-intensive operations, see the following appendices in Vol II of this publication: Appendix E, "Counterdrug Operations — Interagency Coordination," Appendix F, "Foreign ~~Disaster~~ Humanitarian Assistance — Interagency Coordination," and Appendix G, "Noncombatant Evacuation Operations — Interagency Coordination."

8. Interagency Structure in Foreign Countries

~~a. The interagency structure will vary widely from country to country. The key USG organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (SAO) (referred to generically as SAO, but called by a variety of specific names, such as Office of Defense Cooperation, largely governed by the preference of the receiving country) — both part of the country team. In some countries these two functions may be performed by a single military office. The USDAO and the SAO are key sources of information for interagency operations in foreign countries. It is important to understand the differences between these agencies in theater.~~

ba. The Ambassador. The ambassador is the personal representative of the President to the government or international organization to which he or she is accredited and as such is the head of the US diplomatic mission to the HN or organization, responsible for policy decisions and the activities of USG employees in the country. The ambassador ~~— or COM~~ when no ambassador is assigned — employs the country team to integrate all aspects of national policy and will normally maintain good contact with the responsible geographic commander and his staff. The ~~COM (typically the ambassador when assigned)~~ has authority over all elements of the USG in country, except for personnel and forces assigned to a combatant command,

elements of another US mission, or personnel assigned to international agencies. The ambassador interacts daily with the DOS's strategic level planners and decision makers. The ambassador has extraordinary authority and a de facto coordinating mechanism that can be fine-tuned on the spot and tailored to each crisis as it arises, based upon the substance of the problem ~~with little need for written rules. The ambassador functions at both the operational and tactical levels, where provides~~ recommendations and considerations for crisis action planning (CAP) ~~are provided~~ directly to the geographic combatant commander and commander of a JTF. While forces in the field under a geographic combatant command are exempt from the ambassador's statutory authority, the ambassador's political role is important to the success of military operations involving Armed Forces of the United States.

(1) The ambassador and country team normally take the lead for interagency organization for matters that are primarily nonmilitary and organized under appropriate lead agencies abroad.

(2) ~~The US ambassador and country team are normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in countries abroad.~~ When directed by the President and/or Secretary of Defense, the combatant commander employs military forces in concert with other instruments of national power. In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team may ~~have~~ perform complementary activities ~~(that employ~~ ing ~~the diplomatic instrument) of national power.~~ ~~that do not entail control of m~~ Military forces, however, remain under command authority of the combatant commander.

eb. **The Country Team.** The country team is the senior, in-country, United States coordinating body, headed by the COM, and composed of the senior member of each ~~represented~~ United States department or agency in country, as desired by the COM. ~~It includes representatives of all US departments and agencies present in the country.~~ The composition of the country team varies widely depending on specific US national interests in the country, the desires of the COM, the situation within the country, and the number and level of presence of US agencies.

(1) **The country team system provides the foundation for rapid interagency consultation** and action on recommendations from the field and effective execution of US missions, programs, and policies. Under the country team concept, agencies are required to coordinate their plans and operations and keep one another and the ambassador informed of their activities. Senior members of the country team who represent agencies other than the State Department are normally in routine contact with their parent agencies. Issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally or when they have broader national implications.

~~(2) Senior members of the country team who represent agencies other than the State Department are normally in routine contact with their parent agency as described below. Thus, issues arising within the country team can become interagency issues at the national level if they are not resolved locally.~~

(2) The key US military organizations in place within most nations include the US Defense Attaché Office (USDAO) and the security assistance organization (SAO) (referred to generically as SAO, but called by a variety of specific names, such as Office of Defense Cooperation, largely governed by the preference of the receiving country) — both part of the US embassy’s country team. The USDAO and the SAO are key military sources of information for interagency coordination in foreign countries. It is important to understand these and other USG agencies in theater.

(a) **US Defense Attaché (DATT).** The USDAO is an organization of Service attachés, managed by the Defense Intelligence Agency, with agreement on which Service provides defense attachés. The DATT is normally the senior Service attaché assigned to the embassy. The attachés are liaisons to their HN counterparts and valuable sources of information for the ambassador and combatant commander. The DATT may be accredited to more than one country. The attachés ~~serve-report to~~ the ambassador, ~~but and~~ coordinate with, and represent, their respective Military Departments on Service matters. **The attachés assist the foreign internal defense (FID) program by exchanging information with the combatant commander’s staff** on HN military, political, humanitarian, religious, and economic conditions, and interagency ~~operations~~ coordination.

(b) **Security Assistance Officer.** The SAO, the most important FID-related military activity under the supervision of the ambassador, provides officers to country teams. The SAO — which may be comprised of a military assistance advisory group, other military activity, or a single security assistance officer — operates under the direction of the US ambassador but reports administratively to the combatant commander and is funded by the Defense Security Assistance Agency. **The SAO assists HN security forces by planning and administering military aspects of the security assistance** program. The SAO also helps the US country team communicate HN assistance needs to policy and budget officials within the USG. In addition, the SAO provides oversight of training and assistance teams temporarily assigned to the HN. The SAO is prohibited by law from giving direct training assistance. Instead, training is normally provided through special teams and organizations assigned to limited tasks for specific periods (e.g., mobile training teams, technical assistance teams, quality assurance teams).

(c) **US Defense Representative (USDR).** The USDR will normally be ~~either the senior-a~~ military officer or the Defense Attaché assigned to permanent duty in the country. The USDR is the in-country focal point for planning, coordinating, and executing support to USG officials for in-country US defense issues and activities that are not under the mission authority exercised by parent DOD components. The USDR is also the in-country representative of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the geographic combatant commander and is responsible (under the direction of the COM) for providing coordination of administrative and security matters to USG officials for all DOD noncombatant command elements in the foreign country in which the USDR is assigned.

(d) **Embassy Public Affairs Officer.** Public diplomacy involves USG activities directed toward the influence of foreign publics. **The overseas officer responsible for carrying out public diplomacy activities within a given country is the PAO** who reports

1 directly to the ambassador. Public diplomacy involves such activities as information
2 dissemination, interaction with HN media and governmental public affairs offices, sponsorship
3 of exchange programs involving political leaders, academics, scholars and students, presentation
4 of conferences and seminars, and similar activities.

5
6 **dc. Geographic Combatant Commands.** To effectively bring all instruments of national
7 power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and operation plans, combatant
8 commanders are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.

9
10 (1) The JIACG, ~~if activated~~, participates in deliberate, crisis, and transition planning.
11 Representing USG agencies at the HQ of the ~~regional-geographic~~ and selected functional
12 combatant commands, each JIACG is ~~as~~ a multi-functional, advisory element that represents the
13 civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency
14 community. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day working relationships
15 between civilian and military operational planners. Specific objectives are to:

16
17 (a) Improve operational interagency campaign planning and execution.

18
19 (b) Exercise secure collaboration processes and procedures with participating
20 agencies.

21
22 (c) Promote habitual relationships among interagency planners.

23
24 (2) Geographic combatant commanders and, increasingly, commanders, joint task
25 force (CJTFs) may be are assigned a political advisor (POLAD) by the DOS. The POLAD
26 provides USG foreign policy perspectives and diplomatic considerations, and establishes
27 linkages with USG embassies in the AOR and with DOS. The POLAD supplies information
28 regarding policy goals and objectives of DOS that are relevant to the geographic combatant
29 commander's theater strategy. The POLAD is directly responsible to the combatant commander
30 and can be of great assistance in interagency coordination.

31
32 (3) **Other USG agencies may detail liaison personnel to combatant command**
33 **staffs to improve interagency coordination.** For example, intelligence representatives may be
34 assigned to staffs of geographic combatant commands to facilitate intelligence and antiterrorism
35 support.

36 37 **9. The Nongovernmental Organizations' Connection to Joint Operations**

38
39 a. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene
40 before the US military and are willing to operate in high-risk areas. They will most likely
41 remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible,
42 grassroots-focused, primary relief providers.

43
44 b. NGOs provide assistance to over 250 million people annually. **Because of their**
45 **capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises, they can lessen the civil-military**

resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation. Although philosophical differences may exist between military forces and ~~civilian agencies~~ NGOs, short-term objectives are frequently very similar. Discovering this common ground is essential to unity of effort. A very important issue to keep in mind when dealing with NGOs is that they will strongly object to any sense that their activities have been co-opted for the achievement of military objectives. ~~being referred to as the military's "force multipliers".~~ Their mission is humanitarian and isn't to assist the military in accomplishing its objectives. Ultimately, activities and capabilities of NGOs must be factored into the commander's assessment of conditions and resources and integrated into the selected COA.

c. **The Role of NGOs.** NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in the international arena. Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs are assisting in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. **The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another.** NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, and development programs. ~~While their focus remains grassroots and their connections informal, NGOs are important in interagency operations.~~ The sheer number of lives they affect, ~~and~~ the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enables ~~the NGOs community~~ to wield a great deal of power-influence within the interagency and international communities. In fact, individual organizations are often ~~tapped-funded~~ by national and international donor agencies as implementing partners to carry out specific functions. Similarly, internationally active NGOs may employ indigenous groups, such as the Mother Teresa Society in Kosovo, as local implementing partners.

d. **The Increasing Number of NGOs.** A JTF or multinational force (MNF) may encounter scores of NGOs in a joint operations area (JOA). In 1999 in Kosovo, more than 150 NGOs and IGOs had applied to be registered in the province. Over 350 such agencies are registered with the USAID. InterAction, a US-based consortium of NGOs has a membership of over 160 private agencies that operate in 180 countries. The International Council of Voluntary Agencies has a predominantly European membership numbering in the hundreds.

e. **Military and Nongovernmental Organization Relations.** Whereas the military's initial objective is stabilization and security for its own forces, NGOs seek to address humanitarian needs first and are often unwilling to subordinate their objectives to achievement of an end state which they had no part in determining. The extent to which specific NGOs are willing to cooperate with the military can thus vary considerably. NGOs desire to preserve the impartial character of their operations, accept only minimal necessary assistance from the military, and ensure that military actions in the relief and civic action are consistent with the standards and priorities agreed on within the civilian relief community.

(1) The extensive involvement, local contacts, and experience gained in various nations make private organizations valuable sources of information about local and regional affairs and civilian attitudes, and they are sometimes willing to share such information on the

1 basis of collegiality. Virtually all NGO and IGO operations interact with military operations in
2 some way – they use the same (normally limited) lines of communications; they draw on the
3 same sources for local interpreters and translators; and they compete for buildings and storage
4 space. Thus, sharing of operational information in both directions is an essential element of
5 successful civil-military operations.

6
7 (2) While some organizations will seek the protection afforded by armed forces or the
8 use of military transport to move relief supplies to, or sometimes within, the operational area,
9 others may avoid a close affiliation with military forces, preferring autonomous, impartial
10 operations. This is particularly the case if US military forces are a belligerent to a conflict in the
11 operational area. Most NGOs are outfitted with very little, if any, equipment for personal
12 security, preferring instead to rely upon the good will of the local populace for their safety. Any
13 activity that strips an NGO's appearance of impartiality, such as close collaboration with one
14 particular military force, may well eliminate that organization's primary source of security.
15 Their rationale may be fear of compromising their position with the local populace or NGOs
16 may also avoid cooperation with the military out of suspicion that military forces intend to take
17 control of, influence, or even prevent their operations. Commanders and their staffs should be
18 sensitive to these concerns and consult these organizations, along with the competent national or
19 international authorities, to identify local conditions that may impact effective military-NGO
20 cooperation. issues and concerns that are of mutual concern.

21
22 (3) PA planning should include the identification of POCs with NGOs that will operate
23 in the JOA. Military spokespersons should comment on NGO operations based on approved PA
24 guidance and make referrals of media queries to the appropriate organization's spokesperson.

25
26 **f. Military Support of NGOs.** The Secretary of Defense may determine that it is in the
27 national interest to task US military forces with missions that bring them into close contact with
28 (if not support of) NGOs and IGOs. In such circumstances, it is mutually beneficial to closely
29 coordinate the activities of all participants. A climate of cooperation between NGOs, IGOs, and
30 military forces should be the goal. The creation of a framework for structured civil-military
31 interaction, such as a CMOC, allows the military and NGOs to meet and work together in
32 advancing common goals. Taskings to support NGOs and IGOs are normally for a short-term
33 purpose due to extraordinary events. In most situations, logistics, communications, and security
34 are those capabilities most needed. It is, however, crucial to remember that in such missions the
35 role of the armed forces should be to enable, not perform, NGO and IGO tasks. Military
36 commanders and other decision makers should also understand that mutually beneficial
37 arrangements between the armed forces and other organizations may be critical to the success of
38 the campaign or operation plan.

39
40 *See Vol II, Appendix B of this publication, "Nongovernmental Organizations." Annex A of*
41 *Appendix B contains "InterAction's Geographic Index of NGOs."*
42
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44
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46

10. The Role of ~~Global and Regional International~~ Intergovernmental Organizations

IGOs may be established on a global or regional basis and may have general or specialized purposes. NATO and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are regional security organizations, while the African Union (formerly the Organization of African Unity) and the Organization of American States are general regional organizations. A new trend toward subregional organizations is also evident, particularly in Africa where, for example, the Economic Community of West African States has taken on some security functions. These organizations have ~~well~~-defined structures, roles, and responsibilities, and ~~are usually may be~~ equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex interagency ~~operations~~ coordination. The following describes formal or informal ties between the United States and some of the largest of these regional security and international organizations.

a. **The United Nations.** Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with the DOS, through the US permanent representative (PERMREP) to the UN, who shall have the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary (22 United States Code (USC) 287). The US PERMREP is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a **military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) and UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO).**

(1) **The UN normally conducts peace operations or FHA under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly.** Mandates are developed through a political process which generally requires compromise, and sometimes results in ambiguity. As ~~a result~~ with all military operations, UN mandates are implemented ~~for execution~~ by US forces through orders issued by the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During such implementation, the political mandates are converted to workable military orders.

(2) **UN Peace and Humanitarian Organizational Structure.** The UN HQ coordinates peace operations and FHA around the world. **It does not, however, have a system for planning and executing these operations that is comparable to that of the United States.** The UN organizational structure consists of the HQ and the operational field elements. Thus, there is a strategic and tactical-level equivalent to the Armed Forces of the United States, but no operational counterpart.

(a) **At the HQ, the Secretariat plans and directs missions.** Normally, the UNDPKO serves as the HQ component during contingencies involving substantial troop deployments. Some 'peace building' missions with small numbers of military observers are directed by UNOCHA. UNOCHA is a coordinating body that pulls together the efforts of numerous humanitarian/relief organizations and is the vehicle through which official requests for military assistance are normally made. Supplemental US support by temporary augmentation from the Joint Staff and Service HQ staffs may be provided for specific requirements. UN special missions, such as the UN Protection Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, operate under the direction of the UN Secretary General (SYG).

(b) Field level coordination is normally determined on an ad hoc basis, depending on which relief organization is playing the major role. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and ~~the International Committee of the Red Cross~~ UNDPKO are often the logical candidates. UNOCHA may deploy a UNOCHA field team to coordinate FHA or the Emergency Relief Coordinator may designate the resident UN coordinator as Humanitarian Coordinator. Coordination with the UN Resident Coordinator may be degraded if UN personnel are pulled out in the face of increased threat levels.

(c) In certain situations the UN SYG may appoint a Special Representative who reports directly to the SYG but also advises UNDPKO and UNOCHA at UN HQ. The Special Representative may direct day-to-day operations, as was the case in the UN operation in Cambodia.

(3) **United States Military Support.** The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis.

(a) US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (~~Pacific~~ Peaceful Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.

See Vol II of this publication, Annex E, "United Nations," of Appendix C, "Regional and International Organizations," for details regarding the UN Charter and Chapter VI and VII of that charter.

(b) UN-sponsored peace operations normally employ a MNF under a single commander. The ~~multinational force~~ MNF commander is appointed by the SYG with the consent of the UN Security Council and reports directly to the SYG's Special Representative or to the SYG. **When the United States provides support to a UN-sponsored peace operation, the US military structure that is used to conduct multinational operations normally is a JTF.** The CJTF should expect to conduct operations as part of an MNF. US forces may



Joint forces support ~~the~~ UN-coordinated peace operations under the command authority of the US commander.

1 participate across a range of military operations in concert with a variety of USG agencies,
2 military forces of other nations, local authorities, NGOs, and IGOs.
3

4 (c) The chain of command from the President to the lowest US commander in the
5 field remains inviolate. On a case-by-case basis, the President may place US forces participating
6 in multilateral peace operations under UN auspices under the operational control (OPCON)
7 (with modifications) of a competent UN commander for specific UN operations authorized by
8 the Security Council. The President retains and will never relinquish command authority over
9 US forces. The greater the US military role, the less likely it will be that the United States will
10 agree to have a UN commander exercise OPCON over US forces. OPCON for UN multilateral
11 peace operation is given for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign
12 tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. Within
13 the limits of OPCON, a foreign UN commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces
14 outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign UN commander
15 separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their
16 internal organization.
17

18 **b. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.** The NATO experience exemplifies the
19 interagency process on a regional level. Its evolution has been propelled, often in the face of
20 crisis, by the demands for cooperation that characterize every regional effort. The durability of
21 NATO is testament to its success in interagency coordination.
22

23 (1) In 1999 the 19-nation NATO membership included former communist nations of
24 Eastern Europe, and in 2002 seven other Eastern European nations were invited to join.



*Air component forces operating over the mountains of northern Italy
in support of DENY FLIGHT.*

1 ~~(2) NATO orientation has transformed with the changing global environment.~~
2 ~~Dangers to peace and threats to stability in the world remain and are revealed in new forms.~~

3
4 (3) (2) NATO orientation has transformed with the changing global
5 environment. Dangers to peace and threats to stability in the world remain and are revealed in
6 new forms. Coordination of US efforts within NATO begins with the Presidential appointment
7 of a PERMREP, who has the rank and status of ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary
8 and ~~shall be is~~ a COM under the Foreign Service Act of 1980 (22 USC 3901 et seq.). As with
9 any treaty, US commitment to the implementation of the North Atlantic Treaty reflects the
10 balance between the power of the President to conduct foreign policy and Congress' power of
11 the purse. Congress has authorized and regularly funds logistic support for elements of the
12 armed forces deployed to NATO outside the United States and permits cross-servicing
13 agreements in return for reciprocal support. Beyond day-to-day operations, training exercises,
14 and logistics authorized by statute, employment of US military force with NATO requires
15 Presidential action and may be subject to congressional review, including those employments
16 authorized and limited by the War Powers Act.

17
18 c. **Public Affairs Planning with ~~Regional and International~~ Intergovernmental**
19 **Organizations.** The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs) (OASD(PA))
20 provides overall PA guidance and coordinates PA actions affecting IGOs. Planning for support
21 to UN missions will normally include coordination with UN press office personnel through
22 OASD(PA). JTF PA efforts should include the identification of POCs and authorized
23 spokespersons within each ~~regional or international organization~~ IGO.

24
25 *See Vol II of this publication, Appendix C for a detailed discussion of these and other "Regional*
26 *and International Organizations."*
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CHAPTER III

**ORGANIZING FOR SUCCESSFUL INTERAGENCY, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
ORGANIZATION, AND NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COORDINATION
OPERATIONS**

"We must recognize that the Department of Defense contribution to interagency operations is often more that of enabler (versus decisive force, a function we are institutionally more comfortable with). For example, in Rwanda, the military served as an enabling force which allowed the NGOs and PVOs to execute their function of humanitarian relief. A key component to our success in Rwanda was the fact that we consciously stayed in the background and withdrew our forces as soon as the enabling function was complete."

General George A. Joulwan, USA
Commander, US European Command
21 October 1993 – 10 July 1997

1. Organizing for Success

a. When campaign, deliberate, or ~~CAP~~crisis action planning is required, the degree to which military and civilian components can be integrated and harmonized ~~within an interagency context~~ will bear directly on the efficiency and success of the collective effort. **To the extent feasible, joint planning should include key participants from the outset.** The combatant commander through his strategic concept builds the interagency activities into Annex V of the OPLAN. Subordinate JFCs build interagency participation into their operations. Within the AOR and the JOA, appropriate decision-making structures are established at combatant command, JTF HQ, and tactical levels in order to coordinate and resolve military, political, humanitarian, and other issues. This chapter will suggest meaningful tools for the commander to organize for successful interagency coordination, whether in domestic or foreign operations, and focus on the operational level and below.

b. In concert with the NSC, DOD, and Joint Staff, combatant commanders should ~~support effective interagency coordination and identify mutual objectives through:~~

(1) ~~Identify-Recognize~~ **all** USG agencies, departments, NGOs, and IGOs that are or should be involved in the operation. In most cases, initial planning and coordination with USG agencies will have occurred within the NSC, ~~the Office of Department of Defense~~DOD, the Military Services, and the Joint Staff.

(2) ~~Determine-Understand~~ the authoritative interagency hierarchy, to include the lead agency identified at the national level, and determine the agency of primary responsibility. Understand the difference in roles and responsibilities of DOD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, and the Services in domestic versus foreign operations. Understand the different command arrangements between domestic and foreign operations.

"In Operation SUPPORT HOPE, the US military and the UN and NGO community in-theater literally 'met on the dance floor.' Given that a JTF commander's concern will be to ensure unity of effort (not command!), too brief a time to establish relationships can exacerbate the tensions that exist naturally between and among so many disparate agencies with their own internal agenda and outside sponsors. The commander, therefore, will find that, short of insuring the protection of his force, his most pressing requirement will be to meet his counterparts in the US government, UN, and NGO hierarchies and take whatever steps he thinks appropriate to insure the smooth integration of military support . . ."

Lieutenant General Daniel R. Schroeder, USA
Commander, JTF SUPPORT HOPE

(3) **Define the objectives of the response effort.** These should be broadly outlined in the statement of conclusions from the relevant NSC, NSC/PC, or NSC/DC meetings that authorized the overall USG effort. Within the military chain of command, they are further elaborated in tasking orders by the commander's intent.

(4) **Define COAs for ~~both theater~~ the assigned military operations and agency activities-tasks,** while striving for operational compatibility with other USG agencies.

(5) **Cooperate with each agency, department, or organization and obtain a clear definition of the role that each plays ~~in the overall operation.~~** ~~The understanding of operating principles, legal considerations that may restrict military assistance to civilian law enforcement, POCs, crisis management organization, Presidential direction (if applicable), and issues or tasks that cannot be undertaken that may affect mission success.~~ In many situations, participating agencies, departments, and organizations may not have representatives either in theater or collocated with the combatant command's staff. It is then advisable for the combatant commander to request temporary assignment of liaison officers (LNOs) from the participating agencies, departments, and organizations to the combatant command or JTF HQ. In some cases, it may be useful or even necessary for the military to send LNOs to selected other organizations.

(6) **Identify potential obstacles to the collective effort arising from conflicting departmental or agency priorities.** Early identification of potential obstacles and concurrence as to solutions by all participants is the first step toward resolution. Too often these obstacles are assumed to have been addressed by another agency, department, or organization. **If the obstacles cannot be resolved ~~at the JFC's level~~ they must immediately be forwarded up the chain of command for resolution.**

(7) Military and civilian planners should identify resources relevant to the situation. **Determine which agencies, departments, or organizations are committed to provide these resources in order to reduce duplication and increase coherence in the collective effort, and identify what resources are unaccounted for.**

(8) **Define the desired military ~~and overall~~ end states, plan for transition from military to civil authority, ~~post-conflict or post-disaster operations,~~ and recommend exit criteria.**

1 (9) **Maximize the joint force assets to support long-term goals.** The military's
2 contribution should optimize the varied and extensive resources available to complement and
3 support the broader, long-range objectives of the local, national or international response to a
4 crisis.

5
6 (10) **Coordinate the Establishment of interagency assessment teams** that can
7 rapidly deploy to the area to evaluate the situation. These can include ad hoc multilateral teams
8 or teams organized under the auspices of an IGO such as the UN or OSCE.

9
10 (11) **Implement CAP** for incidents or situations involving a threat to the United
11 States, its territories, citizens, military forces, and possessions or vital interests that may require
12 interagency coordination to achieve US objectives.

13
14 **2. Interagency and Nongovernmental Organization Crisis Response: Domestic**
15 **Operations**

16
17 a. As discussed in Chapter II, "Established Interagency Relationships," while the Secretary
18 of Defense reserves authority to employ combatant command resources for CS, **the Secretary of**
19 **the Army is the DOD Executive Agent for the execution and management of military**
20 **support to civil authorities** for natural and manmade domestic emergencies, civil disturbances,
21 and authorized law enforcement activities. The Secretary of the Army exercises his
22 responsibilities through the DOMS-joint director of military support (see Figure III-1). The FBI
23 is the LFA for combatting terrorism within the United States, its territories and possessions, and
24 coordinates and directs the overall federal crisis management response to these incidents, with
25 DOD supporting the FBI. FEMA is the lead agency for the CM response and coordinates the
26 USG response through the process outlined in the FRP.

27
28 b. The appropriate regional combatant commander will be designated as the supported
29 commander, depending on the location of the event. As necessary, the supported commander
30 will activate and deploy an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for the
31 designated DOD CM forces responding to the event. The commander of the JTF will exercise
32 OPCON over designated DOD forces.

33
34 c. The DCO will likely be the initial DOD representative on-site. The DCO will coordinate
35 DOD support to civilian agencies through the FCO at the Disaster Field Office (DFO).
36 FEMA sets up a DFO in or near the affected area to coordinate federal recovery efforts with
37 those of state and local governments upon federal declaration of a disaster. When DOD C2 HQ
38 is deployed, it will accept OPCON of the DCO. However, the DCO remains the POC for the
39 FCO in accordance with the FRP. Once DOD forces have been deployed, requests from civilian
40 agencies will be coordinated through the DCO under the procedures delineated in the FRP.




Figure III-1. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations - Domestic Operations

1
2
3

1 d. **The JTF provides personnel, equipment, and supplies to a disaster area.** Through
2 the DCO, the JTF is oriented on identifying tasks, generating forces, prioritizing assets against
3 requirements, assisting federal and private agencies, and providing disaster response support to
4 the local government based on FEMA mission assignments.

5
6 e. Organizational tools that may assist interagency support of civil authorities include:

7
8 (1) **Interagency Planning Cell (IPC).** The IPC is activated upon receipt of the CJCS
9 warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant commander. **The IPC is established**
10 **to provide timely advice to the supported combatant commander about the resources of**
11 **other agencies in the relief effort.** An IPC will enable a coherent and efficient planning and
12 coordination effort through the participation of interagency subject-matter experts. Moreover,
13 the burden of coordination at the JTF level could also be lightened. Consideration should also
14 be given to establishment of IPCs on the staffs of supporting combatant commanders, such as
15 United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

16
17 (2) **Liaison Section.** ~~Upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order, or at the~~
18 ~~direction of the combatant commander, the liaison section within the combatant command~~
19 ~~staff is activated.~~—Liaisons should be provided to the LFA and other USG agencies as
20 necessary, to act as spokespersons for the combatant commander, to clarify operational concepts
21 and terminology, and to assist in the assessment of military requirements. The intrinsic
22 capabilities of military units to perform in nontraditional roles are important in describing the
23 military contribution to the Federal response. Conversely, agency liaisons working with the
24 military can assist the commander to maximize agency core competencies and concentrate the
25 resources of engaged agencies.

26
27 (a) **Emergency Preparedness Liaison Officers.** EPLOs are directed by the
28 Military Services and selected DOD agencies to coordinate the use of DOD resources to support
29 civil authorities through the DCO during Presidential-declared disasters and emergencies.
30 **EPLOs serve in major civil and military HQ that have primary responsibility for**
31 **planning, coordinating, and executing MSCA in disasters.**

32
33 (b) Supported commanders, such as Commander, USNORTHCOM or
34 Commander, USPACOM, are responsible for a liaison structure to state level within their
35 respective AORs.

36
37 (3) **Interagency Information Bureau (IIB).** **Establish an IIB at each echelon of**
38 **command to provide information to the public.** Emphasis should be placed on describing and
39 promoting the Federal effort. Any friction between agencies should be resolved internally.

40
41 **3. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization**
42 **Crisis Response: Foreign Operations**

43
44 a. **The geographic combatant commander and staff should be continuously engaged in**
45 **interagency coordination by establishing working relationships with relevant organizations**



The geographic combatant commander, having communicated with the ambassador, ensures that appropriate crisis responses are made at the operational level.

1 **and agencies long before CAP and military resources are required.** As situations requiring
2 CAP develop, the normal flow of the State Department and other ~~agency-agencies~~ reporting
3 from the field will increase significantly. This will be amplified by informal contacts between
4 the combatant commander's staff (including the POLAD and JIACG) and appropriate embassies
5 as well as the relevant bureaus at the State Department. Such informal communications greatly
6 facilitate the development of ~~realistic-viable~~ COAs, but should not be used to circumvent
7 established, authoritative planning and direction processes (see Figure III-2).
8

9 **b. Crisis Action Organization.** The combatant command crisis action organization is
10 activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the combatant
11 commander. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the unique requirements of task
12 force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional
13 requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary
14 activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. When
15 establishing a JTF, the combatant commander will select a CJTF; assign a JOA; specify a
16 mission; provide planning guidance; and, in coordination with the CJTF, either allocate forces to
17 the JTF from the Service and functional component forces assigned to the combatant command
18 or request forces from supporting combatant commands. **In contrast, NGOs in the operational**
19 **area may not have a similarly defined structure for controlling activities.** Further, many of
20 these organizations may be present in the operational area at the invitation and funding of the
21 host country. As such, they may be structured to ~~follow-the-conformity-conform-of-with~~ HN
22 regulations or restrictions which may conflict with military operations. Liaison and




Figure III-2. Model for Coordination Between Military and Nonmilitary Organizations – Foreign Operations

- 1 coordinating mechanisms that the combatant commander may elect to establish to facilitate the
- 2 synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:

(1) **Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST).** Early in a developing CCO, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. **The supported combatant commander may deploy a HAST to acquire information for operation order development, to determine the capability of the agencies and organizations already operating in the crisis area, and to what extent military assistance is needed until humanitarian relief organizations or peacekeeping elements can marshal their resources.** In addition to members of the combatant commander's staff, the HAST membership may include key US agency and NGO representatives. Before deployment, the HAST should be provided with the current threat assessment, operations intelligence, and geospatial information. Upon arrival in-country, the HAST should:

(a) Establish liaison and coordinate assessment efforts with the US Embassy or Consulate to help gain access to the appropriate HN officials and to facilitate additional interagency coordination. Integration of the resources provided by these contacts will reduce the potential for duplication of effort and enhance calculations of logistics required to support the collective effort.

(b) Establish liaison with the HN, NGOs, UN organizations, supported commanders or their representatives, and other national teams.

(c) Define coordinating relationships and lines of authority among the military, the embassy or consulate, ~~and~~ USAID, and personnel and others USG and non-USG organizations. This action helps identify specific support arrangements required for the collective logistic effort.

(2) **Agencies providing support services include USAID and its Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) disaster assistance response team (DART).** DART provides rapid response field presence to international disasters with specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills. In concert with the country team, the DART can determine the full range of services necessary in cases of natural disaster. Figure III-3 depicts the organization of the DART.

For further guidance on FHA, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

(3) **Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC).** The supported combatant commander may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. **The HACC provides the critical link between the combatant commander and other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs that may participate at the strategic level in an FHA operation.** Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian humanitarian operations center (HOC) has been established by the lead relief agency, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the combatant commander's staff.

(4) **Logistics Operations Center (LOC).** Combatant commanders exercise directive authority for military logistics within the AOR. **The combatant commander reviews**



Figure III-3. United States Agency for International Development/Office of Government
Foreign Disaster Assistance Response Team

requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities through the CAP process to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The combatant commander is may also be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel, i.e., DOD civilians. A LOC is usually supported by a logistics readiness center and functions as the single POC for coordinating the timely and flexible logistics response into the AOR, relieving the JTF of as much of this burden as possible. Other actions that the LOC may perform or coordinate include:

(a) Continuous coordination with strategic level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency and USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the combatant commander's staff to ensure the required flow of support to the JTF.

(b) Determining the appropriate common-user logistic support responsibilities and organizational structure, to include the appointment of lead Service or agency support. Lead agents may include non-DOD agencies, HN, or multinational partners.

CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION

“The Albanian Government showed considerable vision in establishing an Emergency Management Group (EMG) to coordinate the activities of the key actors in resolving the humanitarian crisis. The Albanian Force (AFOR) was able to reinforce the EMG with staff at the shelter, medical, security and logistic coordination desks. This provided much needed assistance and developed a mutually supportive and trusting relationship, which proved most effective. In addition, an AFOR help desk was established in the NGO information center, based in the pyramid building in the center of Tirana, to provide advice to some 178 registered (and some 50-60 unregistered) NGOs.”

SOURCE: Operation ALLIED HARBOR:
NATO's Humanitarian Mission to Albania

(5) **Liaison Section.** As in domestic operations, the liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to interagency coordination with USG, nongovernmental, and intergovernmental organizations. A liaison section assists the combatant commander by providing a single forum for the coordination of military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged NGOs and IGOs, the HN and indigenous population, ~~and IOs.~~ As in domestic operations, military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN should consider providing liaison personnel to the combatant commander's staff in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Alternatively, as in Albania during Operation ALLIED HARBOR, the HN may establish a coordination center around which the activities of external actors are organized and to which they provide liaison personnel.

c. **USG Agencies and NGO Relationships.** Interagency preparation, planning, and participation in a CCO should occur at the earliest phases of an anticipated operation. Linking Coordinating the actions of USG agency-agencies, IGOs, and NGOs actions with throughout all phases of an operation will assist in the scheduling-integration and coordination of the overall effort.

(1) The USG, via the NSC, ~~NSC/PC, or NSC/DC,~~ may develops and promulgates a POLMIL plan for CCOs in compliance-accordance with PDD-56 and its NSPD successor. This The NSC, either through the interagency committee system or via the POLMIL plan, will designates a lead government agency for ~~a-the~~ mission to ensure coordination among the various USG agencies. Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs participate in the development of the POLMIL plan through the Joint Staff.

(2) Within the theater, the geographic combatant commander is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination. **Combatant commanders may also (and on all CJCS approved plans are directed to) utilize Annex V, “Interagency Coordination,” of OPLANs to request/consider interagency activities and to provide guidance for incorporating the interagency community into military operations.** Combatant commanders should coordinate Annex V with the relevant USG agencies via the Joint Staff. COAs developed by the combatant

1 command staff should consider and incorporate ~~interagency~~ relationships that have been
2 developed with USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.

4. Forming a Joint Task Force

3
4
5
6 a. **When it is necessary to engage the military instrument of national power, and to**
7 **establish a JTF, the JTF establishing authority will normally be a combatant commander.**
8 Figure III-4 outlines key JTF establishing authority responsibilities. The combatant commander
9 develops the mission statement and concept of operations based upon direction from the
10 Secretary of Defense as communicated through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
11 developed, the NSC's interagency POLMIL plan may affect the mission statement. The
12 combatant commander appoints a CJTF and in conjunction with the CJTF determines the
13 necessary military capabilities required to accomplish military objectives. ~~Military objectives~~
14 ~~need to be coordinated with associated diplomatic, information, and economic objectives~~
15 ~~or alternatives.~~—A CJTF has the authority to organize forces and the JTF HQ as necessary to
16 accomplish the objectives.

17
18 b. **The JFC may establish a joint civil-military operations (CMO) task force**
19 **(JCMOTF)** to meet a specific contingency mission or to support humanitarian, nation assistance
20 operations, or a theater campaign of limited duration. There may be a requirement for civil
21 affairs representation because of their professional knowledge of the functional issues involved,
22 as well as their expertise in dealing with other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs.

23
24 *For additional information on the JCMOTF, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military*
25 *Operations.*

26
27 c. **JTF Attributes.** The JTF organization resembles traditional military organizations with a
28 commander, command element, and the forces required to execute the mission. The JTF concept
29 provides for organizational flexibility, is task organized, reflects the mission's requirements and the
30 unique and necessary capabilities of the Service and functional components, and provides for the
31 phased introduction of forces and the rapid deployment of personnel and equipment. A JTF is
32 normally designated when the mission has a specific limited objective and does not require overall
33 centralized control of logistics. **The mission assigned to a JTF will require not only the**
34 **execution of responsibilities involving two or more Military Departments but, increasingly,**
35 **the mutual support of numerous US agencies, and collaboration with NGOs and IGOs.**
36 Normally, a JTF is dissolved when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved. The
37 JTF HQ commands and controls the joint force and coordinates military operations with the activities
38 of other government agencies, MNFs, NGOs, IGOs, and the HN forces and agencies.

39
40 d. **JTFs in the Interagency Process.** Unlike the military, most USG agencies and NGOs ~~may~~
41 ~~are not make the distinction between equipped and organized to create separate staffs at the~~ strategic,
42 operational, and tactical levels, ~~resulting in with the result that~~ JTF personnel ~~interfacing interface~~ with
43 individuals who are coordinating their organization's activities at more than one level. The unique
44 aspects of the interagency process require the JTF HQ to be especially flexible, responsive, and
45 cognizant of the capabilities of US agencies, NGOs, the HN, and IGOs. During

JOINT TASK FORCE ESTABLISHING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBILITIES

- Appointing the commander, joint task force (CJTF), assigning the mission and forces, and exercising command and control of the joint task force (JTF).
 - In coordination with the CJTF, determining the military forces and other national means required to accomplish the mission.
 - Allocating or requesting forces required.
- Defining the joint operations area (JOA) in terms of geography and/or time. (Note: The JOA should be assigned through the appropriate combatant commander and activated at the date and time specified.)
- Ensuring the development and approval of rules of engagement tailored to the situation.
- Monitoring the operational situation and keeping superiors informed through periodic reports.
- Providing guidance (e.g., planning guidelines with a recognizable end state, situation, concepts, tasks, execution orders, administration, logistics, media releases, and organizational requirements).
- Promulgating changes in plans and modifying mission and forces as necessary.
- Ensuring administrative and logistic support.
- Recommending to higher authority which organizations should be responsible for funding various aspects of the JTF.
- Establishing or assisting in establishing liaison with US embassies and foreign governments involved in the operation.
- Determining supporting force requirements.
- Preparing a directive that indicates the purpose, in terms of desired effect, and the scope of action required. The directive establishes the support relationships with amplifying instructions (e.g., strength to be allocated to the supporting mission; time, place, and duration of the supporting effort; priority of the supporting mission; and authority for the cessation of support).
- Approving CJTF plans.
- Delegating the directive authority for common support capabilities (if required).

Figure III-4. Joint Task Force Establishing Authority Responsibilities

1
2
3

CCOs, the JTF HQ provide ~~the~~ an important basis for a unified effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution. **Depending on the type of contingency operation, the extent of military operations, and degree of interagency involvement, the focal point for interagency operational and tactical level coordination with civilian agencies may occur at the JTF HQ, the CMOC, or the HOC.** JTF personnel may also participate actively or as observers in a civilian-led functional coordinating group concentrating on a specific issue or project ~~rather than a military led coordinating group.~~

For further guidance on the forming and composition of a JTF, refer to JP 5-00.2, Joint Task Force Planning Guidance and Procedures.

5. Joint Task Force Mission Analysis

a. **Assessment Team.** A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or ~~chief of mission~~ COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and NGO and IGO representatives. **The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.** The CJTF determines the composition of the assessment team and should include staff members who are subject matter experts and representatives from Service and functional components expected to participate in the actual operation. USG agency representation may include the



Clear goals and the personnel required to complete them are vital to progress and good host-nation relations.

1 USAID/OFDA DART for purposes of FHA operations. Special operations force personnel who
2 possess unique cultural, language, and technical skills may be included. The assessment team
3 may also assist in clarifying the mission and determining force requirements and force
4 deployment sequences for the JTF.

5
6 **b. Coordinated Operations.** Operations by other USG agencies, the equivalent agencies
7 of other national governments, NGOs and IGOs, in concert with or supplementing those of host
8 country entities, will normally be in progress when US forces arrive in a JOA.

9
10 **c. Priority Task.** This may be a military action, a humanitarian task, or a combination of
11 both. **In certain situations, interagency coordination must be a top priority of the CJTF.** It
12 is especially important to not allow the situation to deteriorate.

13
14 **d. Regional Strategy.** In further analyzing the mission, **consider how the regional**
15 **strategy will affect joint force planning and operations in the projected JOA.** The NSC,
16 DOS, and the combatant commander, ~~the UN, and IOs~~ will provide the regional strategy and an
17 appreciation for how the regional strategy affects the countries involved in projected operations.
18 A well-defined regional strategy will legitimize the military mission and assist in determining
19 force requirements and defining end state.

20
21 **e. Political Considerations.** The assessment team should include sufficient expertise to
22 realistically evaluate the political situation. **The JFC should quickly establish a relationship**
23 **with the US ambassador, the country team, and ~~the other~~ US agency representatives in**
24 **country ~~for foreign operations~~.** To the extent that other USG agencies are not present,
25 consideration should be given to placing representatives of relevant USG agencies on the
26 assessment team.

27
28 (1) Situation permitting, the JFC and key staff members should meet with the regional
29 and functional elements of the US agencies involved, the Joint Staff, and embassies of the
30 nations involved. Establishing an effective working relationship with the US ambassador to the
31 HN will help in any foreign ~~interagency~~ endeavor. ~~In cases of operations involving more than~~
32 ~~one country, e~~Each US mission, as well as the various State Department geographic and
33 functional bureaus involved, will likely bring different concerns to ~~the table~~ light.

34
35 (2) Information sharing relationships between the JTF, local and national authorities,
36 the country team, and USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs must be established at the earliest stages
37 of planning. One of the most important ways to facilitate mutually-beneficial information
38 exchange with non-USG agencies is to establish clear guidelines to avoid over-classification of
39 information and to allocate personnel resources to declassifying information as early as
40 operational conditions permit. **Commanders should consider local and organizational**
41 **sensitivities to information gathering activities by joint forces – especially those that may**
42 **be interpreted as ‘intelligence collection.’**

43
44 **f. JTF HQ.** The location of the JTF HQ, whether afloat or ashore, is important. **Not only**
45 **should it be defensible, it should be geographically positioned to work with the HN political**
46 **and private sectors, relief organizations, the media, and MNFs, if present.** Proximity to the

American embassy or US diplomatic mission may enhance ~~military—operational~~
~~capability~~interagency coordination. The JTF HQ requires a sufficient power supply and
communication lines to support operations and should provide a secure site for storage of
classified information.

6. Organizational Tools for the Joint Task Force

a. **The CJTF should consider the establishment of C2 structures that take account of and provide coherence to the activities of all elements in the JOA.** In addition to military operations, these structures should include the political, civil, administrative, legal, and humanitarian elements as well as NGOs, IGOs, and the media. The CJTF should ultimately consider how joint force actions and those of engaged organizations contribute toward the desired end state. This consideration requires extensive liaison with all involved parties as well as reliable communications. An assessment team's mission analysis will assist the CJTF in the establishment of an executive steering group (ESG), CMOC, and liaison teams (see Figure III-2).

"Our relations with the UN/NGO community was furthered greatly by the operations of our three Civil-Military Operations Cells (CMOC). CMOC gives a deployed commander great flexibility. At Entebbe the CMOC became essentially a part of the JTF staff: in Kigali, CMOC was a separate command, and in Goma it was a part of the JTF staff once more. CMOC gives a US unit an invaluable asset in opening relations with the relief community, which, at least in our experience, is extensive. Parts of the NGO, notably the World Food Program and the International Community of the Red Cross (and others) are well organized and experienced in working in this kind of environment. CMOC gives the JTF commander the capability to coordinate and work with these agencies."

**SOURCE: Operation Support Hope 1994 After Action Report
Headquarters, United States European Command**

b. **Executive Steering Group.** The ESG is composed of senior military representatives from the JTF, principals of the embassy, the HN, NGOs, and IGOs present in the JOA. It is the high-level outlet for the exchange of information about operational policies and for resolution of difficulties arising among the various organizations. The ESG is charged with interpreting and coordinating strategic policy as defined by the POLMIL plan or other agreed POLMIL policy objectives. The ESG should either be co-chaired by the CJTF and ambassador or assigned outright to either individual, depending on the nature of the US mission. A commander at any echelon may establish an ESG to serve as a conduit through which to provide information and policy guidance to engaged agencies.

c. **Civil-Military Coordination Board.** This board is the CJTF's vehicle for coordinating civil-military support. Membership is typically restricted to key representatives from the JTF staff sections involved in CMO. Under certain conditions, the CJTF may include representatives from key IGOs and NGOs.

d. **Civil-Military Operations Center.** The ability of the JTF to work with all organizations and groups is essential to mission accomplishment. A relationship must be developed between military forces, USG agencies, civilian authorities, NGOs, IGOs, and the population.

(1) The CMOC is the way US forces generally organize for this purpose (see Figure III-5). Despite its name, the CMOC is a coordinating body and generally neither sets policy nor conducts operations. The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent — flexible in size and composition. During large scale FHA operations, if a HOC is formed by the host country or UN, the CMOC becomes the focal point for coordination between the military and civilian agencies involved in the operation. A commander at any echelon may establish a CMOC to facilitate coordination with other agencies, departments, organizations, and the HN. More than one CMOC may be established in an AOR or JOA (such as occurred in Rwanda), and each is task-organized based on the mission.




Figure III-5. Notional Composition of a Civil-Military Operations Center

1 (2) During Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda, the UN deployed an organization
2 called the On-Site Operations Coordination Center, which had essentially the same functions as
3 a CMOC and provided a clearinghouse for ~~transmitting CMOC responsibilities to exchanging~~
4 information between agencies and with the UN.

5
6 (3) A CMOC is formed to:

7
8 (a) Carry out guidance and institute JFC decisions regarding CMO.

9
10 (b) Perform liaison and coordination between military organizations and other
11 agencies, departments, and organizations to meet the needs of the populace.

12
13 (c) Provide a partnership forum for military and other participating organizations.
14 Many of these organizations consider the CMOC merely as a venue for informal ~~interagency~~
15 discussions.

16
17 (d) Receive, validate, and coordinate requests for routine and emergency military
18 support from the NGOs and IGOs. Forward these requests to the joint force HQ for action.

19
20 (4) **CMOCs are tailored for each mission.** When a CMOC is established, the CJTF
21 ~~may should~~ invite representatives of other agencies, which may ~~that~~ include the following:

22
23 (a) USAID/OFDA representatives.

24
25 (b) DOS, country team, and other USG representatives.

26
27 (c) Military liaison personnel from participating countries.

28
29 (d) Host country or local government agency representatives.

30
31 (e) Representatives of NGOs and IGOs.

32
33 (5) **The CJTF must carefully consider where to locate the CMOC.** Security, force
34 protection, and easy access for agencies and organizations are all valid considerations. The
35 location must be distinct and separate from the joint force operations center, regardless if
36 geographically collocated. If security conditions permit, every effort should be made to locate
37 the CMOC “outside the wire” in order to maximize participation by NGOs and IGOs that want
38 to minimize the appearance of close association with military operations.

39
40 (6) **Political representatives in the CMOC may provide the CJTF with avenues to**
41 **satisfy operational considerations and concerns, resulting in consistency of military and**
42 **political actions.** Additionally, the CMOC forum appeals to NGOs because it avoids guesswork
43 by providing these organizations a single point of coordination with the military for their needs.
44

(a) To obtain the necessary interagency coordination and international cooperation needed to meet mission objectives, CMOC players must rely upon trust, shared visions, common interests, and capabilities.

(b) A JFC cannot ~~direct-interagency-dictate~~ cooperation among engaged agencies. However, working together at the CMOC on issues of security, logistic support, information sharing, communications, and other items, can build a cooperative spirit among all participants.

(7) A CMOC conducts meetings as required to ~~identify components within the interagency forum capable of fulfilling needs~~ highlight requirements — especially humanitarian requirements of the population — and to identify organizations able and willing to meet these needs. Validated requests go to the appropriate JTF or agency representative for action. Figure III-6 depicts some of the CMOC functions.

For further guidance on CMOC, refer to JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

(8) **Liaison Teams.** Once established in the JOA and operating primarily from the CMOC, or HOC, if established, liaison teams work to ensure unity of effort in ~~interagency-multi-~~ agency actions, foster a better understanding of mission and tactics with other forces, facilitate transfer of vital information, enhance mutual trust, and develop an increased level of teamwork.

CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTER FUNCTIONS

- Providing nonmilitary agencies with a coordinating point and information exchange for activities and matters that are civilian related.
- Coordinating relief efforts with US and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host nation, and other nonmilitary agencies.
- Providing interface with State Department Public Affairs officers, US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Country Team.
- Assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies.
- Facilitating and coordinating activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command.
- Receiving, validating, coordinating, and monitoring requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support.
- Coordinating the response to requests for military support with Service components.
- Coordinating requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support.
- Coordinating with disaster assistance response team deployed by USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance.
- Convening ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers.
- Convening follow-on assessment groups.

Figure III-6. Civil-Military Operations Center Functions

CMOC IN PROVIDE COMFORT

Humanitarian relief organizations operating in southern Turkey and northern Iraq coordinated their activities with those of the JTF through the CMOC. The CMOC was collocated with the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) that coordinated the activities of the UN and other humanitarian relief organizations. The CMOC was coequal with the traditional J-staff sections. CMOC military officers coordinated activities with both State Department officials and relief workers. The CMOC in Turkey demonstrated the efficiency and effectiveness of the concept. It provided a focal point for coordination of common civil-military needs and competing demands for services and infrastructure, rather than relying on random encounters between relief workers and staff officers.

SOURCE: Operations Other Than War, Vol. 1, Humanitarian Assistance, Center for Army Lessons Learned, December 1992

(a) **Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2.** Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. In multinational operations, liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, ~~such as between national special operations forces units or naval forces.~~

(b) **The need for effective liaison is vital when a JTF is deployed and operating in a CCO in conjunction with ~~multinational forces~~ MNFs.** The ~~likely possibility~~ likelihood that a JTF may operate with not only traditional allies, but also with nations with whom the US does not have a long history of formal military cooperation, requires the CJTF to plan for increased liaison and advisory requirements.

"Instead of thinking about warfighting agencies like command and control, you create a political committee, a civil-military operations center — CMOC — to interface with volunteer organizations. These become the heart of your operations, as opposed to a combat or fire support operations center."

**General A. C. Zinni, USMC
Commander, US Central Command**

(c) **Qualifications of a JTF LNO assigned to a national or multinational operation include** a solid knowledge of doctrine, force capabilities, language proficiency, regional expertise, and cultural awareness. Civil affairs or coalition support teams may be available to serve as LNOs. The use of contracted interpreters to augment a liaison team may be another option.

(9) **Humanitarian Operations Center.** During large scale FHA operations, when it becomes apparent that the magnitude of a disaster will exceed a HN's capacity to manage it unilaterally, the HN may want to establish a HOC to facilitate the coordination of international aid.

(a) **Although the functions of the HOC and CMOC are similar, there is a significant difference.** The CMOC is established by and works for the CJTF. The HOC is normally established under the direction of the government of the affected country or the UN, or possibly OFDA during a US unilateral operation. HOCs, especially those established by the UN, are horizontally structured organizations with no command or control authority, where all members are ultimately responsible to their own organizations or countries. The US ambassador or designated representative will have a lead role in the HOC.

(b) The HOC membership should consist of representatives from the affected country, the US embassy or consulate, joint force (most likely from the CMOC), OFDA, UN, NGOs, IGOs, and any other major players.

(c) The HOC coordinates the overall US relief strategy, identifies logistic requirements for the various organizations, and identifies, prioritizes and submits requests for military support to ~~the JTF through the CMOC appropriate agencies.~~ Requests for military support may be submitted to the JTF through the CMOC.

(d) An end state goal of the HOC should be to create an environment in which the ~~HN, UN, NGOs, and IOs can assume full responsibility for the security and operations of the humanitarian relief efforts~~ is self-sufficient in providing for the population's humanitarian needs, and no longer requires intrusive form of external assistance.

For further information on HOC, refer to JP 3-07.6, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

7. Other Joint Task Force Interagency Considerations

a. **Intelligence Gathering and Control.** Intelligence support provides the JFC with a timely, complete, and accurate understanding of the environment and potential adversaries.

(1) The combatant command's staff, if required, should request a national intelligence support team (NIST) to support the JTF during a crisis or contingency operation. **NIST is a nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, NSANational Security Agency, National Intelligence and Mapping Agency, and other intelligence community agencies as required.** The interagency support provided by a NIST allows JTF access to national-level databases and to agency-unique information and analysis.

(2) The method for collecting intelligence during a CCO is generally the same as that for any other military operation and is conducted in accordance with JP 2-01, *Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations*. In managing the intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination for a JTF, ~~the effort will~~ may be complicated by ~~nonofficial-non-USG civilians, especially members of NGOs and officials of IOs~~ IGOs, who may be being sensitive to the perception that they are being used to gather intelligence. ~~Such sensitivity includes the arguments—~~ This sensitivity may be based on the viewpoint that intelligence gathering is a provocative act and damages an individual's claim to impartiality. However,

1 general information provided by personnel from NGOs and IGs may corroborate intelligence
2 gained from other sources. Generally, the best approach to information sharing with the NGOs
3 and international civilian community is to keep the focus on complete transparency in sharing
4 operational information and developing a shared situational awareness and understanding of the
5 objectives to achieve the mission.

6
7 (3) Procedures for control and disclosure of classified information, as practiced by
8 DOD and other USG agencies, normally do not exist with NGOs and IGs. Under USC, **it is**
9 **unlawful to disclose classified information to foreign governments without proper**
10 **authorization.** Classified military information shall not be disclosed to foreign nationals until
11 the appropriate designated disclosure authority receives a security assurance from the recipient
12 foreign government on the individuals who are to receive the information. Guidance for the
13 disclosure of classified military information to foreign governments and international
14 organizations is contained in DODD 5230.11, Disclosure of Classified Military Information
15 dated June 16, 1992.

16
17 (a) In most multinational operations, the JFC will be required to share intelligence
18 with foreign military forces and to coordinate the receipt of intelligence from those forces.
19 Release procedures should be established in advance and the JFC participating in the coalition or
20 alliance must tailor the policy and procedures for that particular operation based on national and
21 theater guidance.

22
23 (b) Consideration must also be given to control of sensitive or classified
24 information in forums such as the CMOC that include representatives of ~~other non-~~USG
25 agencies, ~~NGOs, and IOs.~~

26
27 **b. Force Protection.** Force protection planning considerations during complex
28 contingency and multinational operations are similar to US-only operations. However, because
29 of the uniqueness of the operation or area, the multinational nature of the operation, and the
30 nonmilitary organizations operating in an operational area, there are certain aspects about force
31 protection that the CJTF must consider.

32
33 (1) **Other nations do not necessarily execute force protection in the same manner**
34 **as the US military.** If a joint force is under the OPCON of a multinational or coalition force,
35 the JFC must still implement the appropriate force protection countermeasures in accordance
36 with published combatant commander directives.

37
38 (2) **Special measures may be required for joint force personnel who must interact**
39 **with local populations and NGOs.** Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and
40 differing operational terms of reference increase the risk to these joint force personnel.

41
42 (3) Because US forces often assume the leadership role in multinational operations,
43 joint force personnel can potentially be a greater target.

(4) In addition to actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against the joint force, **the JFC may provide security for other personnel and assets.** These requirements must be clearly stated in the mission, to include protection of:

(a) Personnel and equipment belonging to USG agencies, NGOs, and **IGOs.**

(b) Affected country personnel and assets.

(c) Relief convoys, supplies, and main supply routes.

(d) Relief distribution centers.

(e) Stocks of supplies.

(f) Ports and airfields.

c. Logistic Support. Logistic requirements and resource availability coordination are vital to sustain a joint force operation.

(1) **The US military has unique logistic capabilities that are relevant to CCOs.** These include the rapid capability to plan, deploy, employ and redeploy; a robust C2 capability; a sustained logistic capability, and security throughout operations. US agencies, the UN, NGOs, **IGOs,** and MNFs provide for their own logistic support. However, US military logistic capabilities are frequently requested and provided to these organizations. **The JTF may be asked to assume all or part of the burden of logistics for these organizations after arrival.** This support may include intertheater and intratheater airlift, ground transportation of personnel, equipment and supplies, airfield control groups, and port and railhead operations groups.

(2) Unity of effort is essential to coordinate logistic operations in both joint and multinational environments, requiring coordination not only between Services and US agencies, but also among all relief and humanitarian organizations in theater. **The JTF must establish movement priorities between JTF requirements and those of other USG agencies, the country team, coalition or UN forces, NGOs,** and any international joint logistic center, e.g., United Nations Joint Logistic Center, that may be established. The Joint Movement Center is the primary organization for coordinating movements, including that provided by HNs or MNFs, to support joint operations in theater. Close communications should be established with all elements to ensure that their movement requirements are fully understood by the JTF to enable effective planning and security for materiel movement.

(3) Normally, joint forces are supported through a combination of scheduled US resupply, contingency contracting, HN support, and UN logistic support.

(4) When joint forces participate in a UN operation, many of the costs incurred by the US are reimbursable by the UN.

1 (5) In a multinational, non-UN sponsored operation, a single nation may be
2 responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support for all forces on a reimbursable basis.
3

4 **d. Meteorological and Oceanographic (METOC) Support.** The JFC must have access
5 to accurate advance knowledge of METOC conditions to successfully conduct military
6 operations. **The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the**
7 **application of that knowledge could contribute significantly to the success of a JTF**
8 **mission.**
9

10 **e. Legal Issues.** Legal services are provided to the JFC and staff by the ~~Staff Judge~~
11 ~~Advocate (SJA).~~ The SJA should possess a comprehensive understanding of the regulations and
12 laws applicable to military forces and other agencies, both governmental and nongovernmental,
13 domestic and international, and be a POC with NGOs and IGOs, a negotiator with foreign
14 officials, and as a draftsman for command policies, orders, and international agreements. **The**
15 **SJA must be an active participant in the interagency mechanisms to obtain the firsthand**
16 **knowledge necessary to identify and resolve interagency and multinational legal issues**
17 **involving the following:**
18

19 (1) ~~Domestic-IL~~ legal authority for US military and USG agency participation and
20 support.
21

22 (2) International ~~L~~law.
23

24 (a) Dislocated civilians, refugees, immunity and asylum, arrests and detentions.
25

26 (b) War crimes, Status-of-Forces Agreements, Law of Armed Conflict, Military
27 Justice System, Geneva Convention.
28

29 (c) Environmental law.
30

31 (3) Intelligence law.
32

33 (4) Disaster relief and claims.
34

35 (5) ~~Contracting, budget, Contract~~ and fiscal ~~matters~~ law.
36

37 (6) Rules ~~for use of force/engagement of engagement and rules for use of force~~.
38

39 **f. Public Affairs and Media Support.** It is essential that all agencies of the USG work
40 toward a common goal during CCOs by speaking with one voice and sending a consistent
41 message to the audience. At the national level OASD(PA) interfaces with USG agencies in the
42 NSC/DC and passes the information down through PA guidance.
43

44 (1) At the theater level, PA planning in a CCO or multinational operation includes
45 coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, the ambassador, the country team (particularly the

embassy public affairs officer), the HN, national and international media, and media elements of member forces. It is essential that a public affairs and media plan be in place before the operation begins and integrated into the overall OPLAN. **The Joint Information Bureau (JIB) is the focal point for the interface between the military and the media.** When a JIB is established by the JFC, to promote coordination and responsiveness, it is often appropriate to include representatives from the aforementioned organizations. The JFC's PAO plays a major role in keeping USG agencies and NGOs informed on the capability and intent of the joint force.

(2) In the NATO or multinational environment, media consideration will be channeled through JIB equivalents designated as a press information center, combined information bureau, allied press information center, or coalition press information center.

8. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Information Management

a. All military operations, including CCOs, are information intensive. Other USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs on scene are an important source of information that may contribute to the success of the military operation or transition to a desired end state. However, the cultures of ~~these non-USG~~ organizations, in particular, differ markedly from the military and there may be a desire on their part to maintain a distance from military activities. ~~Maintaining an open dialogue with NGOs should foster active participation in the interagency team seeking to resolve the crisis. By attempting to accommodate these concerns and sharing useful information and resources, the CJTF can help encourage active NGO and IGO cooperation in resolving the crisis. They NGO and locally-stationed IGO personnel~~ are usually well-qualified individuals who ~~with an understanding of~~ understand the local culture and practices and have a comprehensive understanding of the needs of the people. The relief community is an important source of information regarding the following:

- (1) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand.
- (2) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces to the populace.
- (3) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders.
- (4) Security situation.
- (5) Role and capabilities of the host-nation government.

THE INTERAGENCY BATTLEFIELD

The simulated conflict area was dotted with soldiers, civilians, and representatives from the same nongovernmental organizations that we have seen in Somalia and Bosnia. Representatives from the International Red Cross, Save the Children, the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs, a USAID Disaster Assistance Relief Team, CARE, World Vision, media representatives, and others all went to Fort Polk, Louisiana. They were there

to work with us, to simulate their roles in these kinds of operations, and to learn with us how we all can accomplish our missions as part of a team.

SOURCE: Observations from August 1994 Joint Readiness Training Center rotation of 25th Infantry Division (Light) in which a variety of agencies participated. General Gordon R. Sullivan and Andrew B. Twomey, *The Challenges of Peace*, (Parameters, US Army War College Quarterly, Autumn edition, 1994)

b. This kind of information is frequently not available through military channels. Therefore, it is important to not compromise the neutrality of the NGOs and IGOs and to avoid the perception by their workers that their organizations are part of an intelligence gathering mechanism. Handled improperly, the relief community can be alienated by a perception that, contrary to its philosophical ideals, it is considered no more than an intelligence source by the military.

9. Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Training and Readiness

"It is imperative that our Joint Forces also enhance their ability to operate in consonance with other US Government agencies, and with nongovernmental organizations (NGO) [and] international organizations (IO) . . . in a variety of settings. The specialized access and knowledge these organizations possess can facilitate prompt, efficient action to prevent conflict, resolve a crisis, mitigate suffering, and restore civil government upon conflict termination. Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends."

National Military Strategy, 1997

a. While numerous humanitarian and complex crises during the previous ~~decade-plus~~ several years have provided ~~independent~~ opportunities for military and civilian agencies to ~~improve readiness and exercise their~~ mission skills, there is a clear requirement for continuous integrated interagency planning and training in order to synchronize all components of a US response to a CCO. One key method to institutionalize interagency training is to persistently carry formal exercises well into Phase IV, post-combat operations, rather than ending after the achievement of Phase III objectives. Interagency training should provide for individual military and civilian instruction, military unit and civilian agency instruction, and combined military and civilian agency training in a formal joint program.

b. **Combatant commanders should schedule interagency coordination training** as a part of routine training and exercise participation and as training for a specific CCO. The training audience should include members of the HACC, CMOC, LOC, the liaison section, NGOs, the UN, and USG agencies. Type-This training before deployment will greatly enhance operational capability. Commanders may also avail their commands to the training offered by some government agencies, IGOs, and the FHA community. Interagency training should focus

on identifying and assessing military and agency capabilities and core competencies, identifying procedural disconnects, and attaining unity of effort.

c. Interagency coordination is also available to US NGOs through ~~an organization consortium~~ called **InterAction** which helps ~~represents~~ NGO interests at the national level. InterAction coordinates with various USG agencies and involves NGOs in realistic peace operations simulation conducted by the Joint Readiness Training Center. The military and participating NGOs also ~~benefits~~ from this training with-by gaining a better understanding of each organization's culture, capabilities, and procedures. ~~the nature and importance of political input.~~ InterAction has also briefed civil affairs units and US military schools to improve their understanding on the activities of NGO activities.

d. Increasingly, interagency training is also available through ~~associated fellowships at senior-level colleges, civilian institutions and the DOS's Foreign Service Institute the senior Service schools (including the State Department's Foreign Service Institute) and other civilian institutions.~~ Interagency training is also provided on-the-job through exchange programs between DOD and other USG agencies. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the National Defense University to develop an interagency training program for civilian and military personnel assigned or pending assignment to the combatant command Joint Interagency Coordination Groups. Courses will be on a resident or exportable basis with an expanding capability to conduct web-accessible education.

e. **The United Nations conducts training and education at various levels** to improve the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of international humanitarian relief operations. Training is available to leaders of the military, civil defense, and civilian relief organizations, or for personnel of countries and organizations with no prior experience in international emergency and disaster response situations. One example is the UN-Civil-Military Cooperation Course that trains individuals in interagency coordination and how to effectively manage the employment of military and civilian resources.

f. **PDD-56 and its successor NSPD (not yet approved) recommend requires** ~~that a political-military implementation (or POLMIL) plan shall~~ be developed as an integrated planning tool for coordinating USG actions in a CCO. The POLMIL plan will include a situation assessment and will specify the concept of operations for all agencies, synchronize agency efforts, and provide a game plan for individual agencies to follow. The directives also points to a POLMIL plan rehearsal and the need for training of mid-level managers (Deputy Assistant Secretary level) to train interagency personnel in the development and implementation of plans for complex contingencies. DOD has designated the National Defense University as the lead agent for POLMIL planning education, training and AARs related to complex foreign crises.

GLOSSARY

PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

1	AAR	after action review
2	AOR	area of responsibility
3	ASD(HD)	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
4		
5	C2	command and control
6	CAP	crisis action planning
7	CBRNE	chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high yield
8		explosives
9	CCO	complex contingency operation
10	CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
11	CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
12	CJTF	commander, joint task force
13	CM	consequence management
14	CMO	civil-military operations
15	CMOC	civil-military operations center
16	COA	course of action
17	COM	chief of mission
18	CONPLAN	concept of operations
19	CONUSA	Continental United States Army
20	CrM	crisis management
21	CS	civil support
22		
23	DART	disaster assistance response team
24	DATT	defense attaché
25	DCO	defense coordinating officer
26	DFO	disaster field office
27	DOD	Department of Defense
28	DODD	Department of Defense directive
29	DOJ	Department of Justice
30	DOMS	director of military support
31	DOS	Department of State
32		
33	EPLO	emergency preparedness liaison officer
34	ESG	executive steering group
35		
36	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
37	FCO	federal coordinating officer
38	FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
39	FHA	foreign humanitarian assistance
40	FID	foreign internal defense
41	FRERP	Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan
42	FRP	f ederal response plan

Glossary

1	HACC	humanitarian assistance coordination center
2	HAST	humanitarian assistance survey team
3	HN	host nation
4	HOC	humanitarian operations center
5	HQ	headquarters
6		
7	ICS	incident command system
8	IGO	intergovernmental organization
9	IIB	interagency information bureau
10	IO	international organization
11	IPC	interagency planning cell
12		
13	J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff
14	J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff
15	J-5	plans and policy directorate of a joint staff
16	JCMOTF	J oint C civil- M military O perations T ask F orce
17	JFC	joint force commander
18	JIACG	joint interagency coordination group
19	JIB	joint information bureau
20	JOA	joint operations area
21	JP	joint publication
22	JTF	joint task force
23		
24	LEA	law enforcement agency
25	LFA	lead Federal Agency
26	LNO	liaison officer
27	LOC	logistics operations center
28		
29	METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
30	MNF	multinational force
31	MOA	memorandum of agreement
32	MSCA	military support to civil authorities
33	MSCLEA	military support to civilian law enforcement agencies
34		
35	NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
36	NCP	National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency
37		Plan
38	NGO	nongovernmental organization
39	NIMA	National Intelligence and Mapping Agency
40	NIST	national intelligence support team
41	NSA	National Security Agency <u>national security act</u>
42	NSC	National Security Council
43	NSC/DC	National Security Council/Deputies Committee
44	NSC/PC	National Security Council/Principals Committee
45	NSC/PCC	National Security Council/Policy Coordination Committee
46	NSCS	National Security Council System

1	NSPD	National Security Presidential Directive
2	NSS	National Security Strategy
3		
4	OASD(PA)	Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
5	OES	office of emergency services
6	OFDA	Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
7	OPCON	operational control
8	OPLAN	operation plan
9	OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
10		
11	PA	public affairs
12	PAO	public affairs officer
13	PDD	Presidential decision directive
14	PERMREP	permanent representative
15	PO	peace operations
16	POC	point of contact
17	POLAD	political advisor
18	POLMIL	political-military
19		
20	SAO	security assistance organization
21	SCO	state coordinating officer
22	SecDef	Secretary of Defense
23	SJA	staff judge advocate
24	SYG	Secretary General (UN)
25		
26	UN	United Nations
27	UNDPKO	United Nations Department for Peacekeeping Operations
28	UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian
29		Affairs
30	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
31	USC	United States Code
32	USCG	United States Coast Guard
33	USDAO	United States Defense Attaché Office
34	USDR	United States Defense Representative
35	USG	United States Government
36	USNORTHCOM	United States Northern Command
37	USPACOM	United States Pacific Command
38	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
39		
40		
41		

PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

~~**centers of gravity.** Those characteristics, capabilities, or sources of power from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. Also called COGs. (JP 1-02)~~

chain of command. The succession of commanding officers from a superior to a subordinate through which command is exercised. Also called command channel. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil support. Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant commander, operational control. (JP 1-02)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CDR. (JP 1-02)

~~**combat service support.** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)~~

~~**combat support.** Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. Also called CS. (JP 1-02)~~

combatting terrorism. Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

combined. Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

~~**command, control, communications, and computer systems.** Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called C4 systems. (JP 1-02)~~

~~**common-user airlift service.** The airlift service provided on a common basis for all Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government. (JP 1-02)~~

complex contingency operations. Large-scale peace operations (or elements thereof) conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations that combine one or more of the elements of peace operations that include one or more elements of other types of operations such as foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, support to insurgency, or support to counterinsurgency. Also called CCO. See also peace operations. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**consequence management.** Those measures taken to protect public health and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the States to respond and the Federal Government to provide assistance as required. Actions that comprise those essential services and activities required to manage and mitigate problems resulting from disasters and catastrophes, including natural, manmade, or terrorist incidents. Such services may include transportation, communications, public works and engineering, firefighting, urban search and rescue, hazardous materials, food and energy. Also called CM. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

~~**Continental United States Army.** A regionally-oriented command with geographic boundaries under the command of United States Army Forces Command. The Continental United States Army is a numbered Army and is the Forces Command agent for mobilization, deployment, and domestic emergency planning and execution. Also called CONUSA. (This term and its definition are applicable only in the context of this pub and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)~~

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (JP 1-02)

counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

course of action. 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept development phase. Also called COA. (JP 1-02)

~~**developmental assistance.** US Agency for International Development function chartered under chapter one of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, primarily designed to promote economic growth and the equitable distribution of its benefits. (JP 1-02)~~

disaster assistance response team. United States Agency for International Development's (USAID) Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance provides this rapidly deployable team in response to international disasters. A disaster assistance response team provides specialists, trained in a variety of disaster relief skills, to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of US Government response to disasters. Also called DART. (JP 1-02)

~~**displaced person.** A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his or her country. See also refugee. (JP 1-02)~~

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

domestic emergencies. Emergencies affecting the public welfare and occurring within the 50 states, District of Columbia, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, US possessions and territories, or any political subdivision thereof, as a result of enemy attack, insurrection, civil disturbance, earthquake, fire, flood, or other public disasters or equivalent emergencies that endanger life and property or disrupt the usual process of government. The term domestic emergency includes any or all of the emergency conditions defined below: a. civil defense emergency — A domestic emergency disaster situation resulting from devastation created by an enemy attack and requiring emergency operations during and following that attack. It may be proclaimed by appropriate authority in anticipation of an attack. b. civil disturbances — Riots, acts of violence, insurrections, unlawful obstructions or assemblages, or other disorders prejudicial to public law and order. The term civil disturbance includes all domestic conditions requiring or likely to require the use of Federal Armed Forces pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 15 of Title 10, United States Code. c. major disaster — Any flood, fire, hurricane, tornado, earthquake, or other catastrophe which, in the determination of the President, is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant disaster assistance by the Federal Government under Public Law 606, 91st Congress (42 United States Code 58) to supplement the efforts and available resources of State and local governments in alleviating the damage, hardship, or suffering caused thereby. d. natural disaster — All domestic emergencies except those created as a result of enemy attack or civil disturbance. (JP 1-02)

1 **end state.** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's
2 objectives. (JP 1-02)
3

4 **federal coordinating officer.** Appointed by the Director of the Federal Emergency
5 Management Agency, on behalf of the President, to coordinate federal assistance to a state
6 affected by a disaster or emergency. The source and level of the federal coordinating officer
7 will likely depend on the nature of the federal response. Also called FCO. (JP 1-02)
8

9 **force protection.** Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of
10 Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical
11 information. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the
12 decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and
13 defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading
14 opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy
15 or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)
16

17 **foreign assistance.** Assistance to foreign nations ranging from the sale of military equipment to
18 donations of food and medical supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters;
19 US assistance takes three forms — development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and
20 security assistance. See also foreign disaster; foreign humanitarian assistance; security
21 assistance. (JP 1-02)
22

23 **foreign disaster.** An act of nature (such as a flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake,
24 volcanic eruption, or epidemic), or an act of man (such as a riot, violence, civil strife,
25 explosion, fire, or epidemic), which is or threatens to be of sufficient severity and
26 magnitude to warrant United States foreign disaster relief to a foreign country, foreign
27 persons, or to an international organization. See also foreign disaster relief. (JP 1-02)
28

29 **foreign disaster relief.** Prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster
30 victims. Normally it includes humanitarian services and transportation; the provision of
31 food, clothing, medicine, beds and bedding; temporary shelter and housing; the furnishing
32 of medical materiel, medical and technical personnel; and making repairs to essential
33 services. (JP 1-02)
34

35 **foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of
36 natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease,
37 hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great
38 damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US
39 forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to
40 supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that
41 may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those
42 conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. See
43 also foreign assistance. (JP 1-02)
44

45 **foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any
46 of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free

and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

humanitarian and civic assistance. Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

intelligence. 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. See also international organization; nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)

~~**internal defense and development.** The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (JP 1-02)~~

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g. a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional or functional basis, for wide-ranging or narrowly-defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Intergovernmental organizations possess legal personality under international law: they can enter into conventions and treaties; they can sue and be sued; they can possess property; and their staffs enjoy diplomatic status. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will be included in JP 1-02.)

~~**international organization.** Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nations agencies. Also called IO. See also nongovernmental organizations. (JP 1-02)~~

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

joint staff. 1. The staff of a commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, joint task force or subordinate functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Military Department), that includes members from the several Services comprising the force. These members should be assigned in such a manner as to ensure that the commander understands the tactics, techniques, capabilities, needs, and limitations of the component parts of the force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition of the force. 2. (capitalized as Joint Staff). The staff under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, as amended by the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Joint Staff assists the Chairman and, subject to the authority, direction, and control of the Chairman and the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in carrying out their responsibilities. Also called JS. (JP 1-02)

joint tactics, techniques, and procedures. The actions and methods that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations. They are authoritative; as such, joint tactics, techniques, and procedures will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. They will be promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in coordination with the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Also called JTTP. (JP 1-02)

joint task force. A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02)

lead agency. Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 1-02)

~~**letter of assist.** A contractual document issued by the UN to a government authorizing it to provide goods or services to a peacekeeping operation; the UN agrees either to purchase the goods or services or authorizes the government to supply them subject to reimbursement by the UN. A letter of assist typically details specifically what is to be provided by the contributing government and establishes a funding limit that cannot be exceeded. Also called LOA. See also peacekeeping (JP 1-02)~~

liaison. That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (JP 1-02)

logistics. The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

military civic action. The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (JP 1-02)

Military Department. One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Also called MILDEP. (JP 1-02)

military operations other than war. Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

~~**military options.** A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: civic action, humanitarian assistance, civil affairs, and other military activities to develop positive relationships with other countries; confidence building and other measures to reduce military tensions; military presence; activities to convey threats to adversaries and truth projections; military deceptions and psychological operations; quarantines, blockades, and harassment operations; raids; intervention operations; armed conflict involving air, land, maritime, and strategic warfare operations; support for law enforcement authorities to counter international criminal activities (terrorism, narcotics trafficking, slavery, and piracy); support for law enforcement authorities to suppress domestic rebellion; and support for insurgencies, counterinsurgency, and civil war in foreign countries. See also civil affairs; foreign humanitarian assistance; military civic action. (JP 1-02)~~

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

1 **nation assistance.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within
2 that nation's territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war, based on agreements
3 mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs may include, but are not
4 limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other United States Code title 10
5 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or
6 international organizations. (JP 1-02)

7
8 **noncombatant evacuation operations.** Operations directed by the Department of State, the
9 Department of Defense, or other appropriate authority whereby noncombatants are
10 evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or
11 natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States. Also called NEOs. (JP 1-02)

12
13 **nongovernmental organizations.** ~~Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain~~
14 ~~a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.~~
15 ~~Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations,~~
16 ~~multinational businesses or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian~~
17 ~~assistance activities (development and relief). "Nongovernmental organizations" is a term~~
18 ~~normally used by non-US organizations. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit~~
19 ~~organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health~~
20 ~~care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict~~
21 ~~resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society.~~
22 ~~They may be local, national or transnational; employ thousands of individuals or just a~~
23 ~~handful; utilize a large management structure or no formal structure at all. Also called~~
24 ~~NGO. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing~~
25 ~~term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)~~

26
27 **operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon
28 at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant
29 command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces
30 are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining
31 commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must
32 be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform
33 those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing
34 commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative
35 direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative
36 direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish
37 missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the
38 commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through
39 subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders.
40 Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and
41 to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to
42 accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for
43 logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also
44 called OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

1 **peace enforcement.** Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to
2 international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to
3 maintain or restore peace and order. (JP 1-02)
4

5 **peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute,
6 designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other
7 such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement.
8 See also peace operations. (JP 1-02)
9

10 **peace operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace
11 enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain
12 peace. Also called PO. See also peacekeeping. (JP 1-02)
13

14 ~~**preventive diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions taken in advance of a predictable crisis to prevent or~~
15 ~~limit violence. (JP 1-02)~~
16

17 **psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to
18 foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately,
19 the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose
20 of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior
21 favorable to the originator's objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)
22

23 **refugee.** A person who, by reason of real or imagined danger, has left their home country or
24 country of their nationality and is unwilling or unable to return. (JP 1-02)
25

26 **regional organizations.** A sub-type of international organization. Regional domestic
27 organizations can cover a particular administrative area, division or district. For the purpose
28 of discussion in this text, regional organizations are included with international organization
29 unless specifically noted as a regional security organizations, e.g., North Atlantic Treaty
30 Organization (NATO). (This term and definition are applicable only in the context of this
31 publication and cannot be referenced outside this publication.)
32

33 **rules of engagement.** Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the
34 circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue
35 combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)
36

37 **security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
38 amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes
39 by which the US provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related
40 services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and
41 objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)
42

43 **special operations.** Operations conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive
44 environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives
45 employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement.
46 These operations often require covert, clandestine, or low visibility capabilities. Special
operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted

1 independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government
2 agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces.
3 Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political
4 risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and
5 dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called SO. (JP
6 1-02)

7
8 **status-of-forces agreement.** An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military
9 force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of
10 visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status
11 of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a
12 more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting
13 force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to
14 the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate
15 matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and
16 population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-
17 02)

18
19 **strategy.** The art and science of developing and employing instruments of national power in a
20 synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational
21 objectives. (JP 1-02)

22
23 **supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a
24 task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning
25 authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who
26 prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of
27 the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the
28 commander who receives assistance from another commander's force or capabilities, and
29 who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance
30 required. (JP 1-02)

31
32 **supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support
33 to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated
34 combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support
35 command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another
36 commander's force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the
37 supported commander. (JP 1-02)

38
39 **unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and
40 composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, that is
41 established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the
42 advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified
43 combatant command. (JP 1-02)

